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INTRODUCTION1
How . . . incredible it is that we should be [involved] here because
of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know
nothing.
—Neville Chamberlain2
Thirty-four years ago, in the celebrated case of Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala,3 a federal appeals court famously4 asserted jurisdiction over a
case with which the United States apparently had no connection. Fi-
lartiga was an action for the death by torture of a Paraguayan, in Para-
guay, at the hands of a Paraguayan official.  Under Filartiga a private
right to sue for damages, in cases alleging violations of international
norms of human rights, became an established5 and rather prideful
feature6 of American justice.  But last Term the Supreme Court all but
killed Filartiga—and did so unanimously.  The case was Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.7
Deploying an old canon of statutory construction—a presumptive
rule against extraterritorial application of acts of Congress—the Kiobel
Court held that tortious violations of international law are not adjudi-
cable in the United States if occurring within the territory of a foreign
sovereign.8  Yet under Filartiga and its progeny,9 the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS),10 an ancient and rather mysterious jurisdictional grant, opens
1 There is a flood of late writing on Kiobel, but I am finding no technical analyses,
such as are offered in this Essay, bringing to bear on Kiobel the existing jurisprudence on
the conflict of laws and the power of the forum in transnational cases.  For the year 2013
alone, a limited but representative selection might include the symposium on Kiobel at 28
MD. J. INT’L L. 1 (2013); Kenneth Anderson, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: The Alien
Tort Statute’s Jurisdictional Universalism in Retreat, 2012–2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 149 (2013);
Anthony J. Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel and Beyond, 44
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1329 (2013); Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme
Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601 (2013).
2 National Broadcast by Neville Chamberlain (Sept. 27, 1938), in NEVILLE CHAMBER-
LAIN, IN SEARCH OF PEACE 174 (1939).
3 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
4 Filartiga is perhaps the most famous federal court of appeals case in history. Cf.
RICHARD A. WHITE, BREAKING SILENCE: THE CASE THAT CHANGED THE FACE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 286 (2004).  For Filartiga’s increasing inspiration to foreign countries, see infra
Parts V, VI.
5 See Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 466 nn.13–15 (1997).
6 See infra Part V.
7 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
8 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665.
9 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 743–44 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated and re-
manded in light of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Doe VIII v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 Fed. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir.
2013); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); In re
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
10 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (“[T]he district courts shall
have . . . cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts,
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American courts11 to universal jurisdiction over tortious violations of
international law, wherever occurring.12  The law applied in these
“alien tort” cases “arises under” federal law for purposes of Article
III13 because the law applied in these cases is federal.  International
norms,  when sufficiently “specific, universal, and obligatory,”14 as
construed, adapted, and applied in our courts as our own policy are
subsumed as federal common law.15
At stake in Kiobel was the possibility of American justice for egre-
gious violations of human rights.16  Far more dramatic and compel-
ling critiques of Kiobel than this Essay  offers can be expected.17  My
commentary here, rather, is technical, doctrinal, and interest-analytic.
My effort is simply to bring to bear on the case some perspectives from
the law of conflict of laws and the law of courts.  These analyses
strongly suggest that the unanimous decision in Kiobel was hardly una-
voidable,18 as the reluctantly concurring Kiobel minority apparently
believed.
as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”).  For the statutory history, see Jennifer Elsea, The
Alien Tort Statute: Legislative History and Executive Branch Views, a Congressional Research
Service Report (Oct. 2, 2003), http://research.policyarchive.org/1864.pdf.  The notable
modern addition is the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, codified as a note to the
Alien Tort Statute, which is today codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
11 The original Alien Tort Statute explicitly provided for concurrent federal and state
jurisdiction.  The modern codification is silent on the point (“The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350), but the default rule is
that federal jurisdiction is always concurrent with that of the state courts unless Congress
explicitly makes federal jurisdiction exclusive.  Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990);
HENRY FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 8–11 (1973); see also THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 82 (A. Hamilton).
12 See generally PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
(2012).
13 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend to
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.).
14 This formulation seems to have appeared first in In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at
1475.
15 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 680–81, 700 (1900) (“International law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropri-
ate jurisdiction . . .”).  See recently the fine exposition in Jordan J. Paust, Kiobel, Corporate
Liability, and the Extraterritorial Reach of the ATS, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. DIG. 18, 19 (2012).
16 Id.
17 For a particularly compelling example see Pierre N. Leval, Distant Genocides, 38 YALE
J. INT’L L. 231, 231 (2013).
18 It is of some interest in this regard that in January 2013, the Netherlands Supreme
Court at the Hague held an oil company, Shell Nigeria, liable to Nigerian farmers for
environmental damage caused by pipeline leaks, the damage occurring within the territory
of a foreign sovereign, Nigeria. See Pieter H.F. Bekker & Brittany Prelogar, Dutch Court
Orders Shell Nigeria to Compensate Nigerians for Oil Pollution Damage Caused by Third-Party Sabo-
tage in Nigeria, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, 1–2 (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.steptoe.com/
publications-newsletter-714.html. Kiobel was handed down only three months later, unani-
mously holding against Nigerian farmers and in favor of an affiliate of the same oil com-
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Let me briefly summarize a few of these points by way of
introduction.
To begin with, in his eagerness to extinguish Filartiga, Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts authored an obviously manipulative opinion for the
Court.  Roberts clearly understood that a canon of statutory construc-
tion cannot be imposed in a blanket way upon a grant of jurisdic-
tion.19  That the Court even considered so doing can be attributed to
a self-inflicted wound.  The Court had mistakenly held in 2004 in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain20 that the Alien Tort Statute was solely jurisdic-
tional.21  That mistake, in turn, can be chalked up to the Court’s fail-
ure to recognize the nature of the class of statutes of which the Alien
Tort Statute is a member.22  If the Justices had been alerted to the
nature of such texts, the explicit cause of action provided by the Alien
Tort Statute might have become visible to them.
The Kiobel Court, moreover, did not consider the bearing of ex-
isting Supreme Court jurisprudence on the power and duty of an
American trial court in the circumstances.  American courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction are under a duty, subject only to exceptions war-
ranted in an individual case, to sit within their jurisdiction as written,
and to open their doors to cases within that jurisdiction as written, no
matter where the underlying events occurred.23  Although apprised by
plaintiff’s counsel of the principle that guides courts in transitory ac-
tions on extraterritorial facts,24 the Court chose to overlook this prin-
pany, on the very ground rejected by the Hague court—that the acts complained of took
place in a foreign country. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662–63,
1669 (2013).  To be sure, in the case at the Hague, the Dutch affiliate of Shell was obvi-
ously within Dutch regulatory power.  Moreover, liability was imposed for common negli-
gence rather than for human rights violations.  However, corporate liability was imposed as
primary liability, rather than on a theory of aiding and abetting, a secondary liability.  Fur-
thermore, liability was imposed notwithstanding that the oil leaks complained of were
caused by sabotage by third parties. See Bekker & Prelogar, supra, at 18 (reporting that the
Dutch court found that Shell Nigeria had breached its duty of care by failing to take suffi-
cient measures to prevent sabotage by third persons to submerged pipelines so near the
plaintiffs’ village).
19 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (Roberts, C.J.) (“We typically apply the presumption to
discern whether an Act of Congress regulating conduct applies abroad. . . .  The ATS, on
the other hand, is ‘strictly jurisdictional.’  It does not directly regulate conduct or afford
relief.”).
20 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
21 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (Souter, J.) (“[T]he ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no
new causes of action . . . .”).
22 See infra Part IV.
23 See infra Part VIII.
24 Transcript of Oral Argument I, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 2012 WL 628670,
at *8 (Feb. 28, 2012) (“MR. HOFFMAN [for Petitioners]: . . . [W]e have a principle of
transitory torts, and . . . I believe other countries have that principle as well. . . . [F]rom
Mostyn v. Fabrigas and before, Mostyn v. Fabrigas being the 1774 case by Lord Mansfield
talking about transitory tort, the courts clearly have the jurisdiction to adjudicate those
kinds of tort claims.”).
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ciple and seemed unaware of its constitutional underpinnings.  As a
result, the Court failed to give due weight to the general duty this
principle imposes on American courts.25
The main arguments of this Essay have to do more specifically
with the law of conflict of laws as applied to the particular facts of
Kiobel.  Notwithstanding that everybody connected with the case—all
of the Justices, the United States as amicus, virtually all commentators,
and the parties themselves—assumed that both parties in Kiobel were
foreign, this assumption turns out to have been unwarranted.26  Once
the facts are given their actual value, foundational Supreme Court
cases on constitutional control of choices of law kick in and point to
governmental interests calling for a very different result.27
The Essay  concludes with its main argument—that Kiobel was
wrongly decided even if the Court were right about the facts.  Justice Ste-
phen Breyer, the author of the minority concurrence in Kiobel, did
suggest a possible national interest in adjudicating Kiobel, but neither
he nor any of the other Justices saw the overriding national interest in
trying the case, and indeed in alien tort litigation generally.  This na-
tional interest has nothing to do with the affiliations of the parties, or
the concept of “significant contacts.”  Even in the total absence of
American territorial contacts with a case, this national interest should
have sustained Kiobel—and Filartiga with it.28
I
A DISTANT ATROCITY
The Kiobel plaintiffs’ story begins during the Abacha dictatorship
in Nigeria in the early 1990s.  Drilling for oil had already blighted
much of the landscape at the Niger Delta.29  Shell, the largest of the
foreign oil companies drilling in Nigeria, was moving deeper into the
delta’s back country.  Subsistence farmers were clustered in villages
there, peoples of the Ogoni tribes.30  Trees were felled on lands on
which they had dwelled from time immemorial.  Their streams were
25 See infra Part VIII.
26 See infra Part X.A–B.
27 See infra Part X.
28 See infra CONCLUSION.
29 See, e.g., John Vidal, Niger Delta Oil Spills Clean-up Will Take 30 Years, says UN, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/aug/04/ni-
ger-delta-oil-spill-clean-up-un (“Devastating oil spills in the Niger delta over the past five
decades will cost $1bn to rectify and take up to 30 years to clean up.”).
30 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013) (“Petitioners were
residents of Ogoniland, an area of 250 square miles located in the Niger delta area of
Nigeria and populated by roughly half a million people.”); see also Howard W. French,
Nigeria Accused of a 2-Year War on Ethnic Group, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1995), http://www.
nytimes.com/1995/03/28/world/nigeria-accused-of-a-2-year-war-on-ethnic-group.html?
pagewanted=all&src=pm.
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becoming polluted.31  They protested.  Environmentalists and journal-
ists rushed to the delta.  At the instigation of Shell, General Abacha
ordered environmentalist leaders and reporters jailed.32  But the pro-
tests continued, and Shell demanded an end to them.  With Abacha’s
help Shell recruited Nigerian soldiers and mercenaries to do the job,
permitting them to use Shell’s facilities as their base of operations,33
and paid, fed, and housed them.34  There ensued a two-year genocidal
campaign of terror, killing, rape, torture, arson, and pillage35—a veri-
table Conradian horror.36  Villages were leveled and inhabitants mur-
dered.  Hundreds of villagers were displaced.  A few Ogoni were able
to flee, among them Esther Kiobel.
Granted asylum in America, eventually Kiobel and other Nigerian
refugees brought suit.37  They sought damages for wrongful death,
torture, personal injuries, and loss of property.  Jurisdiction was
pleaded under the Alien Tort Statute.38  This statute was originally
part of the First Judiciary Act of 1789.39  Its current codification40 still
31 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
32 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
33 A characterization of Shell Nigeria’s conduct as “aiding and abetting” seems inade-
quate in view of the direct responsibility suggested by these allegations. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at
1662.  The resort to “aiding and abetting” probably reflects counsel’s recognition that di-
rect corporate liability seems unlikely to survive in the Supreme Court in any context,
whether extraterritorial or not. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008) (holding that aiding and abetting securities fraud is not
compensable in damages, at least where the abettor did not personally benefit; reasoning
that although the civil action for fraud in the purchase and sale of securities was judicially
created, in the silence of Congress it would be going too far for judges to extend this body
of federal common law to secondary liability).  Yet an abettor of securities fraud could
hardly be surprised by the imposition of liability, since the aider and abettor of the crime
of securities fraud is punishable under the general provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2, and could
hardly be surprised even in the absence of criminal sanction.
34 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63 (“[Shell] aided and abetted these atrocities by, among
other things, providing the Nigerian forces with food, transportation, and compensation,
as well as by allowing the Nigerian military to use [Shell’s] property as a staging ground for
attacks.”).
35 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662 (“Throughout the early 1990’s, the complaint alleges,
Nigerian military and police forces attacked Ogoni villages, beating, raping, killing, and
arresting residents and destroying or looting property.”).
36 French, supra note 30.
37 With the assistance of environmentalists, eventually litigation was also initiated in
the Netherlands. See Liesbeth Enneking, The Future of Foreign Direct Liability?  Exploring the
International Relevance of the Dutch Shell Nigeria Case, 10 UTRECHT L. REV. 44, 45 (2014).  In
the Netherlands case, there has been a victory at the Hague for one of the Nigerians, in a
stunning civil suit arguably following the lead of Filartiga.  This is referenced by Enneking
as the “Dutch Shell Nigeria Case.”  For developments in the case, see supra note 18.
38 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
39 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77.
40 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”).  Because federal jurisdiction is not exclusive in terms, the
presumption is that this jurisdiction is concurrent.
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vests concurrent jurisdiction in federal and state courts41 over a single
rather curious form of action.  The action must be brought “by an
alien”; it must be for “a tort only”; and the tort must be “in violation of
the law of nations.”  The statute is often said to have lain dormant for
its peculiarities.42  On its face it seemed problematic,  creating a pri-
vate right to sue for a violation of public law.  Still, although courts
tended to dismiss,43 before Filartiga at least twenty-two cases were
brought in state and federal courts.44
It was not until 1980, in Filartiga,45 that the Alien Tort Statute
came into substantial modern use.  Under Filartiga the plain language
of the Alien Tort Statute is taken seriously.  On its face the statute
authorizes American jurisdiction over a foreigner’s claim of a tortious
violation of international law—that is, over a federal common-law ac-
tion for damages for an abuse of human rights.  Under Filartiga, this
jurisdiction is universal.  In other words, under the Alien Tort Statute,
a claim lies even, or especially, for violations occurring abroad—even,
or especially, in cases between foreigners.46
41 See supra note 11; Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 461 (“It is black letter law . . . that the mere
grant of jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court from concur-
rent jurisdiction over the cause of action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
42 See, e.g., Simon Baughen, Holding Corporations to Account: Crafting ATS Suits in the
UK?, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 533, 536 (2013) (“[The ATS] lay dormant for nearly two
centuries.”); Jide Nzelibe, Contesting Adjudication: The Partisan Divide over Alien Tort Statute
Litigation, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 475, 476 (2013) (referring to the ATS as “a long dor-
mant, founding-era statute”).
43 For an alien tort litigation in the years immediately preceding Filartiga, see Huynh
Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1978) (involving attempt to gain custody of
children evacuated from Vietnam in “Operation Babylift”).  For somewhat earlier discus-
sion of the uncertainties surrounding alien tort litigation, see Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger,
528 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
44 A cursory Westlaw search reveals only two federal actions brought under the statute
before 1940. See O’Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908); Moxon v. The Fanny,
17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793).  Some interest in alien tort litigation seems to have arisen
after World War II.  Between 1945 and 1980, the year Filartiga came down, there were by
my count some fourteen cases in federal courts and six in state courts.
45 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.  Although Judge Kaufman suggested in Filartiga that the
law to be applied might be that of Paraguay, the place of injury in that case, Filartiga actions
came to be governed by federal common law, since they require application of interna-
tional norms, which, as construed and adapted in our courts, are subsumed as federal
common law.  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).  This federalization of inter-
national “norms” may be related to the positivistic insights that law emanates from a partic-
ular sovereign, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938); Southern Pacific Co.
v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The common law is not a
brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi
sovereign that can be identified.”); The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922) (Holmes,
J.) (“[T]here is no mystic overlaw to which even the United States must bow.”).
46 See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of
Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 462 (1989) (“[C]ases brought on essentially the same set of
facts as Filartiga—actions by a torture victim against the torturer or the torturer’s superior
officer where the defendant was within the personal jurisdiction of the court—have gener-
ally succeeded.”); see generally American Society of International Law, International Litigation
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In Filartiga itself, for example, a Paraguayan family living in the
United States, and applying for political asylum here, filed suit in fed-
eral district court against a former Paraguayan official who had over-
stayed his visa and was living in the United States also.47  The family
alleged that the official had tortured and killed their son in Paraguay.
They sought damages.  The Second Circuit made news by reversing
the judgment of dismissal entered by the district court below; seeing
the Alien Tort Statute as a grant of universal jurisdiction on its face;
and applying it to torture by an official of a foreign government.48
Filartiga, like a modern “We hold these truths to be self-evident,”
electrified international lawyers, and indeed is increasingly influenc-
ing writers and judges throughout the Western world.49  It was on Fi-
lartiga and its progeny50 that the Kiobel plaintiffs relied.
II
THE COURT STEPS IN: SOSA
The Supreme Court first dealt with Filartiga twenty-four years af-
ter it was decided, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.51  In Sosa, a Mexican
doctor, Alvarez-Machain, allegedly assisted in the torture and killing
of an American Drug Enforcement Agency official.52  The good doc-
tor53 was kidnapped by Drug Enforcement Agency operatives, with the
assistance of Sosa, a Mexican former police officer, for prosecution in
the United States.54  The question whether the kidnapping comprised
a sufficient offense to the Fourth Amendment to require dismissal of
the prosecution came before the Supreme Court in 1992; the Court
held that it did not.55  The prosecution went forward.  To the mortifi-
cation of the federal agents, Alvarez-Machain came away with a di-
In Practice: Alien Tort And Other Claims Before National Courts, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 149
(2000).
47 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878–79.
48 Id. at 887.
49 See, e.g., Burley, supra note 46, at 461–62 (“Scholars and human rights lawyers
hailed Filartiga for . . . opening up a new field of human rights litigation.”).
50 For well-known examples of Filartiga-style litigation, see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671
F.3d 736, 743–44 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded in light of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir.
2011), vacated, 527 Fed. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005, 1005 (1996); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human
Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 496–97 (9th Cir. 1992).
51 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
52 Id. at 697.
53 The characterization in the text is appropriately snide, since Alvarez-Machain had
allegedly worked to keep a federal agent alive so that he could be tortured longer.  “Alva-
rez-Machain . . . was present at the house and acted to prolong the agent’s life in order to
extend the interrogation and torture.” Id.  One suspects that this life-prolonging feature of
his alleged crime may have confused the jury.
54 Id. at 698.
55 U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992).
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rected verdict of acquittal.56  The government had not made out its
case.  The doctor then turned around and sued the American offi-
cials, and Sosa as well.  He pleaded, inter alia,57 a claim under the
Alien Tort Statute.
In dealing with the alien tort claim, the Sosa Court assumed the
existence of Filartiga, thus seeming to set its imprimatur on the case.58
But the apparent quid pro quo for this acknowledgment took the
form of new limits on the kinds of violations of international law that
could be adjudicated as federal common-law claims within the juris-
diction of the Alien Tort Statute.59  All the Justices agreed in Sosa, and
agreed again in Kiobel, that the First Congress intended the Alien Tort
Statute to be a grant of jurisdiction only.60  But this conclusion seems
a stretch in view of the plain language of the statute.  Curious as this
tort-free interpretation appears, it was taken seriously, perhaps be-
cause it figured in the famed debate between Judge Bork and Judge
Edwards in the Tel-Oren case in the D.C. Circuit61 and found consider-
able acceptance among scholars.62
Notwithstanding Justice Souter’s adoption in Sosa of the “jurisdic-
tion-only” view of the Alien Tort Statute—perhaps a sop to the con-
servative wing—he proceeded to take the position that the statute did,
in fact, at least contemplate an action in tort in violation of interna-
56 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
57 There were additional claims against the federal officials under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for kidnapping, wrongful arrest, and wrong-
ful detention.  The discussions of the FTCA and Bivens claims in Sosa are beyond the scope
of this Essay.
58 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (“[N]o development in the two centuries from the enactment
of § 1350 to the birth of the modern line of cases beginning with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala . . .
has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of na-
tions as an element of common law.”).
59 Id. (arguing for a “restrained conception of the discretion a federal court should
exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind”).
60 Id. at 713 (“As enacted in 1789, the ATS gave the district courts ‘cognizance’ of
certain causes of action, and the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not power to mold
substantive law.”); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013) (“The
statute provides district courts with jurisdiction to hear certain claims, but does not ex-
pressly provide any causes of action.”).
61 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  Judge Bork
argued that litigation under the Alien Tort Statute could proceed only if Congress enacted
a cause of action cognizable within the jurisdiction granted. Id. at 778.  This was an ex-
treme interpretation that would nullify the jurisdiction granted.  Judge Edwards took the
text of the statute more literally and saw that the statute explicitly provided an action for a
tortious violation of international law. Id. at 782.
62 For early support of Judge Edwards’s view that the ATS includes a cause of action,
see Anthony d’Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers?: Judge Bork’s Concept of the Law of
Nations Is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 92, 100–04 (1985).  For the view that the
Alien Tort Statute is now jurisdictional only because Sosa so held, and that earlier readings
of the statute to the contrary are irrelevant, see William Casto, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and
the End of History, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1001, 1001–05 (2012).
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tional law.  But here, too, he conceded to the conservatives that the
only torts cognizable under the statute were those few that had the
“definiteness” and “acceptance among civilized nations” of actions
contemplated in the early Republic.63  None of this backing and fill-
ing was called for.  Although the Alien Tort Statute is undoubtedly an
explicit grant of jurisdiction, it also clearly provides a cause of action,
albeit in general terms.  I surmise that the Court discounted the em-
phatic substantive statutory language only in part because the Alien
Tort Statute originated in the Judiciary Act of 1789, a statute gov-
erning courts,64 and appears today in the Judicial Code among other
jurisdictional grants.65  The Court’s mistake was in failing to recognize
the class of statutes to which the Alien Tort Statute belongs.  This is
the common class of statutory causes of action that require further
pleading particularizing the statutory tort.  For example, nobody to-
day would deny that the Civil Rights Act of 187166 creates “a cause of
action” for a state or local official’s deprivation of a federal right.  But
it requires further identification of the right of which the complainant
allegedly was “deprived”—some specific right enumerated in the Bill
of Rights, or some unenumerated but fundamental right, or some spe-
cific statutory right.67  Similarly, nobody would deny that a state
wrongful death act creates a cause of action for wrongful death, even
though it requires the additional pleading of the nature of the
“wrong” causing the death.  Negligence?  Battery?  Product defect?
And so on.
This double-pleading feature can also be seen, analogously, in
certain actions under the Constitution.  A complainant relying on one
of the Due Process Clauses must plead that clause, but in addition,
except for cases alleging procedural faults or faulty choices of law,
must plead the specific liberty of which the complainant allegedly was
deprived—typically a violation of some more specific constitutional
right, like the right to speak freely.
Grants of specific heads of subject-matter jurisdiction are exam-
ples of the class precisely because they identify the general subject
matter of the claims cognizable within the jurisdiction granted.  But
typically they do so without specifying particular claims.  For example,
63 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
64 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77; see supra note 10.
65 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see supra note 40.
66 Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
67 Id. (referring in general terms to the tort of subjecting a person to a “deprivation”
of an unidentified statutory or constitutional right: “Every person who, under color of
[law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress”).
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the Constitution, Article III, extends federal judicial power to “all
Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” and Congress has
vested that jurisdiction in the first instance in the district courts;68 but
neither the constitutional nor the statutory grant enumerates the spe-
cific wrongs remediable in admiralty.69  Such grants can include the
requisites and bounds of the jurisdiction granted—often territorial
bounds, as in a state legislature’s grant of probate jurisdiction to a
court sitting in each county.  Others, of course, are often quite spe-
cific.  A family court may have statutory jurisdiction over cases of di-
vorce and child custody.  But many subject-matter grants require
additional pleading of a particular wrong.  The Alien Tort Statute is a
jurisdictional grant that describes with seeming specificity the exact
nature of the causes cognizable within the jurisdiction granted.  The
action within this jurisdiction must be “for a tort” and “only” for a
tort—no action in contract or replevin will lie.  Furthermore, the tort
must be some “violation of the law of nations.”  Notwithstanding this
degree of detail, it becomes necessary to plead what the particular
violation was.  Torture?  Piracy?  Slave trafficking?  Genocide?  Legisla-
tures often frame statutory causes of action as grants of jurisdiction to
the courts that will try them.70  If their reference to the subject matter
requires further pleading of the nature of the particular claim they
fall squarely within the class of texts I have been describing.  Against
this background, it is untenable to read the Alien Tort Statute as a
jurisdictional grant only, particularly in view of the unusually explicit
cause of action it describes, an action “for a tort only in violation of
the law of nations.”  Both the Sosa and Kiobel Courts sensibly came
round to the view that alien tort jurisdiction at least contemplates a pri-
vate right of action for violation of international law.
Justice Souter recognized this extra pleading feature in Sosa, in
effect, when he pointed out that, since the jurisdiction was for a tort, it
was not meant to be pointless.71  From his inquiry into the original
intention of the First Congress and the general understandings ob-
taining in the early Republic, he concluded that the chief concern
underlying the grant of jurisdiction was to provide a forum for local
failures of respect to foreign diplomats on our soil, including disre-
gard of letters of safe passage.72  Souter cited Blackstone for the view
68 Today codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
69 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
70 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (granting the district courts jurisdiction to hear claims
arising under patent, copyright, or trademark law).
71 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 719 (2004) (“[T]he First Congress did not
pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future
Congress or state legislature that might, someday, authorize the creation of causes of
action . . . .”).
72 Id. at 719.
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that piracy also was universally triable.73  Slave trading might be an-
other such instance.74  Those were also the examples mentioned in
Filartiga.75
Justice Souter also sought to win his majority in Sosa with a bow to
the conservatives’ widely shared but mystifying view that Filartiga is to
be impugned because it is federal case law.  Souter argued that “ex-
tending” Filartiga to violations of human rights too unlike those con-
templated by the First Congress could offend something in Erie, or at
any rate could offend modern understandings of Erie ; these modern
understandings, he wrote, require courts to be chary in providing fed-
eral answers to federal questions.  Instead, judges should leave that
task to legislatures.76  But of course, a question of the meaning and
extent of an international norm is more particularly a question of fed-
eral common law in our courts, as they construe and adapt or reject
those norms.77  And Article III extends the whole of the judicial power
to all federal questions.78  Nothing in Erie repeals Article III or in any
other way delegitimizes federal case law.79
At some cost, then, to more rational views, in Sosa Justice Souter
was able at least to put Filartiga on life support, barely saving it by
reading it, as appeared at the time, very narrowly.  Justice Scalia, con-
curring, protested that the Court’s opinion was not a limitation on
73 Id. at 714.
74 Id. (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68
(1769)).
75 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (“[T]he torturer has become . . . like the pirate and slave
trader before him . . . .”).  For the view that the original alien tort jurisdiction was also
intended for violations of human rights generally, see Jordan J. Paust, Kiobel, Corporate
Liability, and the Extraterritorial Reach of the ATS, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. DIG. 18, 22–23 (2012).
76 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726–27 (“[A]long with [a] conceptual development in under-
standing [the] common law has come an equally significant rethinking of the role of the
federal courts in making it.” (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938))).
“[T]his Court has recently and repeatedly said that a decision to create a private right of
action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of cases.”  However,
Erie specifically held, in analogously describing the authority of state law, that it could make
no difference to a court whether the law to be applied in civil cases is decisional or en-
acted. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its
Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern.”).  It is a central holding of Erie that case law is not to be put at a discount.  In
common experience, case law is superior to statutory law.  The Supreme Court of the
United States has the last word on the meaning of federal law, and is not to be disregarded;
and a state’s supreme court has the last word on the meaning of state law, and is not to be
disregarded.
77 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate juris-
diction. . . [W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.”).
78 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties . . . .”).
79 See generally Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805 (1989).
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Filartiga but an open invitation.80  Scalia’s prediction has been sub-
stantially borne out.  Lawyers apparently took less notice of Justice
Souter’s reluctant attempts to cabin Filartiga than of the fact of the
Supreme Court’s acceptance of Filartiga.  After Sosa, numerous new
cases were filed.81
So matters stood when, in Kiobel, the unanimous Court, like blind
Samson, brought the Filartiga edifice crashing down.
III
KIOBEL: AN UNANTICIPATED QUESTION
Filartiga cases against private corporations rather than govern-
ment officials have always been watched with special anxiety.82  They
often settle before trial.83  Although a Filartiga filing was likely to result
in dismissal, a company could certainly fear that some jury might im-
pose billions in damages upon it for aiding and abetting the misdeeds
of authorities in a badly governed country, putting the company’s cor-
porate reputations under a cloud simply for doing business there.
The claim in Kiobel was one of this latter class, a claim against Dutch,
British, and Nigerian companies for aiding and abetting a govern-
ment—Nigeria—in its violations of human rights.  The plaintiffs’ per-
ception that the Roberts Court would not impose direct Filartiga
liability on a private corporation probably accounts for the pleading
of aiding and abetting, although the Court is no friend of secondary
liability either.84  Indeed, the Supreme Court first heard oral argu-
80 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 750–51 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]n this illegitimate lawmaking
endeavor, the lower federal courts will be the principal actors; we review but a tiny fraction
of their decisions.  And no one thinks that all of them are eminently reasonable.”).  How-
ever, Justice Scalia, a chief antagonist of federal common-law claims, has no hesitation in
ignoring his dislike of federal common law when it comes to fashioning new federal com-
mon-law defenses. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988)
(Scalia, J.) (arguing that in cases that involve “uniquely federal interests” federal common
law can “displace” state law).
81 Preliminary research reveals approximately fifty post-2004 district court cases citing
both Filartiga and Sosa.  Allowing for estimated irrelevant instances, there have been at least
forty filings.
82 Jide Nzelibe, Contesting Adjudication: The Partisan Divide over Alien Tort Statute Litiga-
tion, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 475, 495 (2013).
83 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2010) (Jacobs, C.J.)
(“[A] variety of issues unique to ATS litigation . . . resulting [in] complexity and uncer-
tainty . . . has led many defendants to settle ATS claims prior to trial.”); see also Donald E.
Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation,
100 GEO. L.J. 709, 715 (2012) (stating that while many ATS suits brought against compa-
nies ultimately went to final decision, many settled).  For post-Kiobel speculation that the
question of corporate liability remains open, see Bauman v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 644
F.3d 909, 923 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); see generally Peter Henner, When
Is a Corporation a Person? When It Wants To Be. Will Kiobel End Alien Tort Statute Litigation? 12
WYO. L. REV. 303 (2012).
84 See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148
(2008) (denying an action for aiding and abetting securities fraud against persons who did
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ment in Kiobel solely on the question whether the Filartiga cause of
action encompassed suits against corporate defendants.85  Numerous
anxious briefs were filed on behalf of the defendant companies.  It
was during that first argument that Justice Alito put a wholly unantici-
pated question:
The first sentence in your brief . . . is really striking: “This case was
filed by 12 Nigerian plaintiffs who alleged that Respondents aided
and abetted the human rights violations committed against them by
the Abacha dictatorship in Nigeria between 1992 and 1995.”  What
does a case like that—what business does a case like that have in the
courts of the United States?86
Justice Alito’s question seems to have transfixed the Court.  What
possible interest could the United States have in adjudicating a case in
which all three of the kinds of contacts that “count” had nothing to do
with the United States?  The plaintiffs were native Nigerians.  The de-
fendant was a Dutch corporation.  And the alleged atrocities were per-
petrated in Nigeria.  This is the triply foreign configuration referred
to in oral argument as “foreign-cubed.”87  What national interest could
possibly justify American courts in taking hold of such a case?
The Supreme Court ordered reargument of this new question.88
The Court was free to frame the question as having to do, broadly
speaking, with the existence vel non of some national interest in adju-
dicating a case like Kiobel.  But the Court framed the new question as
an old-fashioned one about national territory rather than a modern
one about governmental interest.  The parties were directed to argue
the question “[w]hether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort
Statute . . . allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of
the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other
than the United States.”89
not profit from but simply cooperated in the fraud); Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (holding that no action can lie for
aiding and abetting securities fraud).
85 See Transcript of Oral Argument I, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 2012 WL
628670, at *13–14 (Feb. 28, 2012).  Although the Supreme Court held nongovernmental
organizations to be improper defendants in litigation over alleged torture by officials of
the Palestinian Authority in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1704
(2012), that action was not brought under the Alien Tort Statute.  For late discussion, see
generally Alison Bensimon, Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute: Can Corporations
Have Their Cake and Eat it Too? 10 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 199, 210 (2013).
86 2012 WL 628670, at *11.
87 Transcript of Oral Argument II, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 2012 WL
4486095, at *13 (Oct. 1, 2012).
88 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738, 1738 (2012) (Mem.).  It is worth
emphasizing that this belated issue had been neither briefed nor argued, and was not part
of any judgment below.  The Supreme Court nevertheless did not remand, apparently as-
suming that the facts were, in effect, stipulated. But see infra Part X.
89 132 S. Ct. at 1738 (internal citations omitted).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-6\CRN607.txt unknown Seq: 15 22-SEP-14 12:13
2014] KIOBEL AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1485
Kiobel involved facts (as the Court saw them) roughly like those of
Filartiga: foreign plaintiffs,90 foreign defendants,91 and a foreign atroc-
ity.92  But Filartiga had been an action against a foreign official, not a
private corporation.  The only issue decided by the court of appeals in
Kiobel was that pesky question of corporate liability vel non in alien
tort.93  The court of appeals had not reached the further question,
whether alien tort litigation against a corporation could proceed on a
theory of aiding and abetting.  The district court, for its part, had re-
jected several of the Kiobel plaintiffs’ claims, but it had not done so on
territorial grounds.94  In short, neither the parties nor the courts be-
low had seen Kiobel as presenting a problem of extraterritoriality.  The
reargument, then, was on a question neither briefed nor argued previ-
ously—an issue not considered in the courts below: whether an Amer-
ican court was empowered to hear cases on wholly foreign facts.  Thus
revised, Kiobel posed an obvious threat to the survival of Filartiga.95
Suddenly the case became one of great moment, obviously threat-
ening to all alien tort litigation in this country.  Solicitor General Ver-




When the Court held that the Kiobel case, based as it was on
events arising within the territory of another sovereign, could not be
tried in this country,96 the weight of the decision fell with destructive
90 These were several refugees from Nigeria who had been granted asylum here.  Ki-
obel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).
91 The three named defendants were essentially alter egos of the same company, one
of which had been superceded by another, each wholly owned by the third, and all ulti-
mately owned by the Shell Group. See infra Part X.B.
92 But see infra Part X.A–B.
93 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010).
94 See generally id. (dismissing claims for destruction of property, forced exile, and ex-
trajudicial killing; sustaining claims for torture, arbitrary detention, and unspecified crimes
against humanity).
95 For presentiments of the danger Kiobel would present for Filartiga, see Ian Binnie,
Judging the Judges: “May They Boldly Go Where Ivan Rand Went Before”, 26 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 5,
18 (2013); Louise Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking
Power, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1057, 1090 & nn.141–43 (2013); Leval, supra note 17, at 249.
The question of the extraterritorial reach of alien tort actions had been expressly reserved
in the only earlier Supreme Court review of such actions, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 712–13 (2004), along with an equally blinkered reservation of the question whether
such actions should require exhaustion of local remedies, id. at 733 n.21.  For thoughtful
post-Sosa concern about restrictions on Filartiga actions, see Childress, supra note 83, at
712–15.
96 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013).
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force on Filartiga97—on American alien-tort litigation all together.
One of the shocking features of this enormity was that the Court per-
petrated it unanimously.98  The Court held that this result was re-
quired by a hoary canon of statutory construction—a presumptive
rule against extraterritorial application of an act of Congress.  The
Chief Justice, writing for the Court, offered arguments about the im-
portance of this presumptive rule; about the national interests justify-
ing the rule; and about the consequences of failure to apply it.99  But
he did not consider the importance of Filartiga; the national interests
in Filartiga-style litigation; or the consequences of shutting that litiga-
tion down.
Chief Justice Roberts could not very well argue that the statutory
references to “an alien,” “tort,” “violation,” and “the law of nations,”
were an insufficient indication of the nature of the claims cognizable
within the jurisdiction.100  He simply declared that no case concerning
events occurring within the territory of a foreign sovereign could be
triable in this country,101 untroubled by the fact that such a rule could
apply even where both parties are affiliated with the United States.  To
be sure, the Court had also put the new question for decision in Kiobel
without reference to the affiliations of the parties.  In retrospect one
can see that the question from the beginning was freighted with its
own inevitable, sweepingly broad answer.
As many writers will have pointed out by the time you read this,102
the Roberts Court’s new territorialism in a major transnational case
97 The threat Kiobel posed for Filartiga was sufficiently obvious at the outset that Dolly
Filartiga herself had joined a brief amicus in support of the Kiobel petitioners. See Brief for
Amici Curiae Abukar Hassan Ahmed et al., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co. (No. 10-
1491), 2012 WL 2165343, at *1.
98 The ineffectual hand-wringing of the concurring minority Justices, to be discussed
infra this Part, should not distract the observer from the wrongness of the decision.
99 For recent approval of Kiobel, redeemed by a fine discussion of the intellectual his-
tory of the rule against extraterritoriality, see Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unex-
pected by Scholars but Consistent with International Trends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671 (2014).
100 In his concurrence, Justice Breyer tried to argue that in these ways the statute could
be construed as contemplating application to extraterritorial events, as did the early use of
the statute against pirates. Id. at 1672.
101 Id. at 1669 (Roberts, C.J.) (“We therefore conclude that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts
that presumption . . . and petitioners’ case seeking relief for violations of the law of nations
occurring outside the United States is barred.”).
102 See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 67, 69 (2009) (arguing that common decisions on issues ranging from personal juris-
diction to choice of law all have implications for global governance).  In the context of
commercial cases, see the valuable discussion in Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann,
Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2008) (urging nations with
strong court systems to entertain foreign litigants).  For discussion of transnational corpo-
rate criminal liabilities, see generally Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions,
97 VA. L. REV. 1775 (2011) (analyzing, among other things, U.S. prosecutions against for-
eign actors).
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seems remarkably retrograde when considered in light of the modern
reality that we live in a globalized world; that our national interests are
global in scope; and that litigation necessarily arises touching Ameri-
can interests abroad.  The Court is collapsing the global emanations
of the many ramified spheres of American interest into a single plani-
sphere,103 and compressing that into the confined shape of the
United States on a map, with a bulge for our territorial waters.  This is
the diminished America the Court saw in the 2010 Morrison case,104
“presumptively” limiting securities fraud litigation—a much more ex-
tensive item on federal dockets than alien tort cases—to domestic
transactions.105  As in Morrison, the Kiobel Court relied, without qualifi-
cation or embarrassment, on the case of EEOC v. Arabian American Oil,
better known as Aramco,106 a case so wrong that it was promptly repu-
diated by Congress.107
Yet I would caution humanitarians not to fault the Court too
strenuously for deciding Kiobel on some such ground.  Of course the
Court’s territorialism was outdated, a lazy pasting over of a case calling
for analysis of the governmental interest of the United States in adju-
dicating the particular cause of action in the particular case.  But a
more interest-analytic approach might have led the Court to strike
down the Alien Tort Statute as unconstitutional as applied on wholly
103 Andrew Marvell, The Definition of Love, in METAPHYSICAL LYRICS & POEMS OF THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 77 (Herbert J.C. Grierson ed., 1921):
Unless the giddy Heaven fall,
And earth some new Convulsion tear;
And, us to joyn, the World should all
Be cramp’d into a Planisphere.
104 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (employing a near-
conclusive presumption against extraterritorial application of acts of Congress with respect
to securities fraud litigation).  For excellent discussion of the Supreme Court’s imposition
of ex ante door-closing rules as affecting the regulation of globalized commerce, see David
L. Noll, The New Conflicts Law, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 41 (2014).
105 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267 (confining the territorial reach of the anti-fraud provision
(section 10(b)) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to “transactions in securities listed
on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities”).  Congress rather
promptly legislated a partial override of Morrison, securing the powers of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, at least, to deal with “extraterritorial” securities fraud. See Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010).  On the effect of Morrison on criminal cases, see generally David Keenan &
Sabrina P. Shroff, Taking the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Seriously in Criminal Cases
after Morrison and Kiobel, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 96 (2013).
106 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (citing EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991)); Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255 (same).
107 Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e(f), 2000e-1(b)–(c) (overriding Aramco prospectively). Aramco had removed the
protections of American civil rights, employment, and labor laws from women, gays, and
racial minorities seeking to qualify for posts in intolerant and repressive countries, like
Saudi Arabia.
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extraterritorial facts,108 a holding that would have rendered Kiobel sub-
stantially unamenable to legislative revision.109  The constitutional
question was all too available.  That is because only an identified gov-
ernmental interest could supply the rational basis that due process
requires, at a minimum, not only of assertions of subject-matter juris-
diction, but of all governmental action,110 including choices of law.
And the Court was unable to see any national interest in the case at
all.  For those who would like to entertain a hope of legislative revi-
sion, it is fortunate that the Kiobel Court’s inability to identify such an
interest was diverted to a territorial shibboleth.
One could have wished that the Chief Justice’s opinion for the
Kiobel Court had less of an appearance of manipulation to suit the
work at hand.  Recall that the statute the Chief Justice purported to
construe was held purely jurisdictional in Sosa.111  It was held not to
provide a cause of action.112  All the Justices in Kiobel reaffirmed and
insisted on this rather disregardful reading.113  Now consider that a
canon of statutory construction is not readily applied to a jurisdic-
tional grant, particularly a federal jurisdictional grant.
The Supreme Court is created by the Constitution, but all other
Article III courts are created exclusively by Congress.114  In other
words, federal jurisdiction is always written.  It is always statutory.  Fed-
eral courts are therefore familiarly described as courts of limited juris-
diction.  They can sit only within the written limits of some statute
granting jurisdiction, and all statutory grants of jurisdiction must fall
within one of the enumerated heads of jurisdiction to which the judi-
108 Cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (Brandeis, J.).  In Dick, the Court
struck down Texas’s application of its own law under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Texas had increased the liability of the defendants although, in Bran-
deis’s view, the case had nothing to do with Texas.  Brandeis reasoned that a state “may not
abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or to
be done within them.” Id. at 411. For discussion of the body of law of which Dick is the
foundation, see infra Part IX.
109 The D.C. Circuit reached the due process question lurking in Kiobel in reviewing
the prosecution of a Somali piracy abettor in U.S. v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(holding that prosecution for acts committed outside the Unites States did not violate due
process).
110 Weinberg, supra note 95 (locating early examples of rationality review in Supreme
Court cases on choice of law; arguing that governmental power arises from the identified
governmental interests that provide the rational bases of law); Louise Weinberg, Unlikely
Beginnings of Modern Constitutional Thought, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 291 (2012) (tracing pre-
vailing modes of constitutional analysis to early cases on due process control of choices of
law).
111 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
112 Id. at 738.
113 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661–62 (2013).
114 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.”).
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cial power is extended in Article III.  Moreover, a federal court sits
within its statutory grant of jurisdiction to the full extent of that juris-
diction.  Even a challenge to a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdic-
tion cannot deprive it of its power to adjudicate the challenge.
Statutory limits may be construed and interpreted as applied in partic-
ular cases, of course, and exceptions to the jurisdiction may be found
in particular cases.  But courts—federal courts certainly—may not in-
vent blanket limits upon their jurisdictional grants when there are
none.  Whatever defenses to its jurisdiction a federal court may see fit
to apply in a particular case, only Congress can limit the jurisdiction
of federal courts in a blanket way.  Legislatures familiarly place ex-
plicit territorial limits on a court’s jurisdiction themselves, when that is
what is intended, as when a probate court is designated as sitting in a
certain county.  But obviously that court cannot limit its own jurisdic-
tion to the town in which it sits.  It must sit as a probate court for the
county, as its jurisdictional authorization mandates.  If the legislature
does not designate the territorial limits of a court’s jurisdiction, there
are none.
In part for this reason, Chief Justice Roberts became willing, but
only in a back-handed way, to credit the ATS at long last with provid-
ing a cause of action—the “tort . . . in violation of the law of na-
tions”—that the statute obviously does provide.  He declared, “The
question presented is whether and under what circumstances courts
may recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute, for viola-
tions of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign
other than the United States.”115  He went on, “The question here is
not whether petitioners have stated a proper claim under the ATS, but
whether a claim may reach conduct occurring in the territory of a
foreign sovereign.”116  By this language, Roberts recognized the statu-
tory cause of action that had existed all along.  But he put the focus
on a problem, as he saw it, of extraterritoriality, as if it were an explicit
statutory limit.  By this means he could avoid acknowledging that he
was attempting to apply a canon of construction to what he had always
insisted was a jurisdictional grant, and therefore incapable of blanket
judicial limitation.  But in dodging Scylla, alas, Roberts came smack
up against Charybdis.  How could a canon of statutory construction ap-
ply to case law?—to a nonstatutory cause of action like the action
opened up by Filartiga?
Roberts had to switch gears again.  Still trying to base the conclu-
sion he wanted to reach on something other than judicial fiat, he
pitched his conclusion, in the end, on a line of reasoning that
stretched the asserted rule to its intended target.  He argued that the
115 133 S. Ct. at 1662 (emphasis added).
116 Id. at 1664.
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rule against extraterritoriality—however conclusively and sweepingly
he meant to apply it—is nevertheless presumptive only, as it was de-
clared to be in Morrison.117  So the presumption can be rebutted.  But
it can be rebutted only by clear inference from the statute—unfortu-
nately still a jurisdictional grant.  Still glossing over that little problem,
Roberts pointed out that the ATS is, indeed, silent about its applicabil-
ity to extraterritorial facts.118  There was simply nothing in the statute
to rebut the presumption, Q.E.D.  This argument ought to have
availed the Chief Justice little, however, because statutory silence cuts
two ways.  But Roberts was sure about the way silence cut in this case.
Triumphantly, he chose as the default rule for the alien tort jurisdic-
tion one that nicely (from his point of view) defeats the object of the
jurisdictional grant.
Let us pause for a moment to call to mind what Chief Justice
Roberts was not talking about—a genocidal attack on African villagers
by their lawless government and a lawless corporation.  This was a
murderous rampage that persisted over two years without effectual
condemnation or interference, obscured from view in a primitive for-
est world, hurting only a few hundred primitive people.  With that
picture in mind, we can well understand that the Court’s default rule
not only virtually repealed the Alien Tort Statute but also had the in-
evitable effect of withholding the rule of law from lawless places.
Chief Justice Roberts did not think to offer some reply to the argu-
ment, latent but anxious, that the asserted rule against extraterritorial-
ity, when applied in the context of Filartiga cases, protects terrorism
and genocide—in Kiobel, murder, rape, torture, arson, and pillage.119
As Justice White had once remarked, dissenting in another transna-
tional case, the Court had validated a “lawless act.”120  So universal are
the norms of international law proscribing such acts that Filartiga cases
typically do not present a conflict of laws.  As other commentators
have observed, all civilized governments today outlaw murder, maim-
ing, rape, torture, arson, and pillage, just as they outlaw piracy and
trafficking in slaves.121
In the real world, much rests on confidence that there will be
good order.  Law and order are self-evidently necessary for the fur-
therance of commerce and enterprise as well as for the protection of
117 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
118 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (Roberts, C.J.) (“To begin, nothing in the text of the
statute suggests that Congress intended causes of action recognized under it to have extra-
territorial reach.”).
119 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
120 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 456 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting).
121 See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International “False Conflict”
of Laws, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 881, 883 (2009).
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the populace.122  Yet large parts of the world struggle against violence,
not infrequently under corrupt or oppressive or predatory or even
murderous misgovernment.123  In such a world, given our global com-
mercial and other interests and responsibilities, it would seem the bet-
ter part of wisdom, in the silence of Congress, for our courts to adopt
default rules that extend the rule of law to those luckless places rather
than to deny or defeat the rule of law.  Stern warnings that the United
States cannot rule the whole world are well enough, perhaps, if we are
talking about military interventions. But they can have little to do with
this reality as it may confront courts of law, which do not “rule” coun-
tries but decide cases before them.  I would go further and suggest
that even statutory territorial or other limits on American judicial
power in Filartiga cases should not prevent a judicially crafted excep-
tion in any American court in the face of clear lawlessness and clear
injury, all else equal.124
The Chief Justice’s justifications for the improvidence of a rule of
law supporting lawlessness, justifications with which many readers
might reluctantly have to agree, concerned a perceived need to pro-
tect the foreign relations and foreign policy of the United States from
judicial interference,125 and a fear of retaliatory civil actions against
Americans.126  However, Roberts could offer no examples, either of
such interference or of such retaliation, although Filartiga litigation
dates back to 1980. The available evidence suggests, rather, that Filar-
tiga is becoming an inspiration abroad.127
122 See World Justice Project, “Report: Rule of Law” (explaining the rule of law as ena-
bling “fair and functioning societies”), http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law
(last visited Aug. 5, 2014); Chudi Ubezonu, Doing Business in Nigeria by Foreigners: Some As-
pects of Law, Policy, and Practice, 28 INT’L LAW. 345, 358 (1994) (stating that: Nigeria became
“trapped in a political quagmire created by the established military junta. On June 26,
1993, the junta, for no apparent reason other than to perpetuate itself in power, annulled
the presidential elections held two weeks earlier, elections that had been adjudged free
and fair by both international and domestic observers. This type of action is bound to be a
disincentive to a prospective foreign investor”); see generally INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES 3–4 (Wolfgang Kaleck et al. eds., 2007).
123 See Leval, supra note 17, at 232; Robert F. Worth & Eric Schmitt, Jihadist Groups Gain
in Turmoil Across Middle East, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
12/04/world/middleeast/jihadist-groups-gain-in-turmoil-across-middle-east.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0; Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Says Aid Crisis Worsens in Central African Re-
public, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/04/world/africa/aid-
crisis-in-central-african-republic.html; Hannah Beech, Deadly Terrorist Attack in Southwestern
China Blamed on Separatist Muslim Uighurs, TIME (Mar. 2, 2014), http://time.com/11687/
deadly-terror-attack-in-southwestern-china-blamed-on-separatist-muslim-uighurs/.
124 To take a mundane example, consider the tradition of equitable tolling of a statute
of limitations in the interest of justice.  For a current affirmation of this principle in the
Supreme Court (over strong dissent), see McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1936,
1942–43 (2013).
125 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664–65.
126 Id. at 1664 (citation omitted).
127 See infra Part VI.
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Even so, two of the Justices would have gone further than the
Chief Justice.  Justice Alito, concurring, joined by Justice Thomas,
urged that an alien tort action be barred even in a case arising within
our territorial limits—“unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to vio-
late an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of def-
initeness and acceptance among civilized nations.”128
Justice Breyer’s concurrence was joined by the three other liber-
als.  Bartleby-like, the liberals simply “would prefer not to”129 join the
Court’s opinion.  Yet, while purporting to concur in the judgment
only, Justice Breyer swallowed the bitter dose almost whole.  Justice
Breyer declared that, if it were up to him, he would not invoke a pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality.130  But then he did invoke it, list-
ing a territorial contact with the United States as the first of his
proposed three alternative bases for alien tort jurisdiction:
I would not invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Rather, guided in part by principles and practices of foreign rela-
tions law, I would find jurisdiction under this statute where (1) the
alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an Ameri-
can national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and ad-
versely affects an important American national interest, and that
includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from be-
coming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a
torturer or other common enemy of mankind.131
But the Chief Justice, in effect, had already offered the excep-
tions Justice Breyer proposed.  Toward the conclusion of his opinion,
the Chief Justice acknowledged the possibility of matters that might
“touch and concern” the United States.132
Justice Breyer also offered an extended argument that the place
where an action arises cannot be the only touchstone of national in-
128 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).  The position is, in fact, correct.
Our ordinary tort law and civil rights laws will cover most cases. See infra Part VII.
129 See Herman Melville, Bartleby the Scrivener, PUTNAM’S MAGAZINE (1853), reprinted in
HERMAN MELVILLE, PIAZZA TALES 25 (1856).
130 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
131 Id. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 (1987) (recognizing, subject to a reasonableness requirement, § 403, that a
sovereign may apply its law, including its case law, among other things, to: (a) the “activi-
ties, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory”; (b)
“conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory”; and (c) certain foreign “conduct outside its territory . . . that is directed against
the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests”).
132 On the need for governance of foreign financial transactions, see John C. Coffee,
Jr., Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259
(2014), in this symposium.  For grudging acknowledgment of this reality, see Kiobel, 133 S.
Ct. at 1669 (“And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United
States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterri-
torial application.”).
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terest, since piracy could arise in the territorial waters of another sov-
ereign.133  In such limited ways, Justice Breyer sought to ameliorate
Chief Justice Roberts’s requirement of “a clear indication” of congres-
sional intention that legislation have extraterritorial application.134
But Breyer failed to articulate the urgently needed defense of Filartiga.
Justice Kennedy concurred separately also, to convey to Court
watchers a narrow reading of what the Court had done, reading less
broadly the opinion’s more sweeping passages.  Henceforth, he de-
clared, Filartiga torture actions would simply be tried under the Tor-
ture Victim Protection Act.135  But the Torture Victim Protection Act
is hardly the remedy Filartiga is.136  The Act requires exhaustion of
local remedies—“reasonable” and “available” ones, to be sure.137  But
what scene of foreign atrocity is likely to have reasonable available
remedies and courts empowered and eager to provide them?  The Fi-
lartigas’ lawyer was arrested and disbarred for bringing a prosecution
in Paraguay.138  Moreover, the Torture Victim Protection Act carries a
ten-year statute of limitations.139  This, at a time, for example, when
133 Justice Breyer’s extended argument about piracy included the point that a ship is
traditionally presumed to be under the sovereignty of the flag it flies. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at
1672 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer’s examples included our victory over the Bar-
bary Pirates, which brought our marine forces to the shores of Tripoli; the sinking of the
Lusitania off the coast of Ireland with many Americans on board; the bombing of Pan
American Flight 103, at sea, the plane exploding over Scotland.  In arguing that the flag a
vessel flies makes it the territory of another sovereign, he might have given the example of
the terrorists aboard the foreign-flag vessel Achille Lauro, who cast into the sea an elderly
American cripple in his wheelchair. See Robert Fisk, How Achille Lauro Hijackers Were Se-
duced by High Life, THE INDEPENDENT (May 5, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/
voices/comment/robert-fisk-how-achille-lauro-hijackers-were-seduced-by-high-life-8604519.
html.  Presumably Justice Breyer did not offer the bombing of marine barracks in Lebanon
during the Reagan administration, the attack of the U.S.S. Cole in the Yemeni port of
Aden, and, more recently, attacks on our embassies in Africa and the murder of our ambas-
sador and others in Libya, because these events occurred on our territory or on a ship
under our flag. See Jim Michaels, Recalling the Deadly 1983 Attack on the Marine Barracks, USA
TODAY (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/nation/2013/10/23/marines-bei
rut-lebanon-hezbollah/3171593/; CNN Library, USS Cole Bombing Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 18,
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/meast/uss-cole-bombing-fast-facts/; US
Envoy Dies in Benghazi Consulate Attack, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2012/09/20129112108737726.html.
134 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (“[T]o rebut the presumption, the ATS would need to
evince a ‘clear indication of extraterritoriality.’  It does not.” (citing Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010))).
135 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Torture Victim Protection Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as a Note to the Alien Tort
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)).
136 See, analogously, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24 (1980) (holding that the Federal
Tort Claims Act could not preempt the federal common-law Bivens action against federal
officials, the two being very different remedies, and the latter essential to enforcement of
civil rights).
137 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(b).
138 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
139 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(c).
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Argentina is seeking extradition of Franco-era140 malefactors from
Spain,141 and Germany is making renewed efforts to bring to book
surviving perpetrators of the Holocaust.142  A ten-year period is one in
which perpetrators are likely to be alive, and often able to command
considerable loyalty and resources.  In such circumstances, justified
fears may keep victims from coming forward with their claims.  Be-
yond this, the Torture Victim Protection Act, analogous to the Civil
Rights Act of 1871143 and its federal common-law analog, Bivens,144
requires that the defendant have acted “under color of . . . law,” re-
moving the possibility of private corporate liability.145
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy expressed some concern that the
reasoning of the Court in support of the presumption against extrater-
ritorial application of law was not all it should be.  It was too narrowly
dependent on foreign policy concerns to give assurance that it would
cover future cases; moreover the reasoning about the rule against ex-
traterritoriality might also in future have to be more fully fleshed
out.146  One cannot say that Kiobel was utterly unreasoned.  But, as Jus-
tice Kennedy politely suggested, it would need fleshing out.
V
FILARTIGA IN FLAMES
Let us return for a moment to the oral arguments in Kiobel. On
both those occasions the Justices seemed concerned that the United
States was the only country in the world to assert universal jurisdiction
in civil actions like Filartiga.147 The implication was that Filartiga
ought to be a subject of reproach.148  But surely more fit for reproach
140 Raphael Minder, Argentina Seeks Spanish Officials’ Extradition for Franco-Era Abuses,
N.Y. TIMES A6 (Oct. 2, 2013); Francisco Franco, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/top-
ics/francisco-franco (noting that Generalissimo Francisco Franco ruled Spain from 1939 to
1975).
141 See Spain Stonewalls on Franco-era Abuses, EL PAI´S (Oct. 8, 2013), http://elpais.com/
elpais/2013/10/08/inenglish/1381233605_231882.html.
142 See Late Justice: Germany to Prosecute 30 Auschwitz Guards, SPIEGEL ONLINE INTERNA-
TIONAL (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/nazi-murder-
germany-may-prosecute-30-former-auschwitz-guards-a-920200.html.
143 Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
144 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971) (implying a private right to sue federal officials for violation of the
Constitution).
145 Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710–11 (2012).
146 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
147 Transcript of Oral Argument I, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 2012 WL 628670,
at *3–4 (Feb. 28, 2012); Transcript of Oral Argument II, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co.,
2012 WL 4486095, at *5–6 (Oct. 1, 2012).
148 The approved alternative seems to be an international tribunal or fund established
to distribute partial compensation to individuals for violations of human rights.  Even when
some such arrangement is the subject of executive agreement only, our courts hold that
they are bound by these arrangements, even insofar as our residents may be stripped of
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-6\CRN607.txt unknown Seq: 25 22-SEP-14 12:13
2014] KIOBEL AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1495
than the justice of American courts would be judicial protection of the
perpetrators of atrocious wrongs.  It is possible, rather, to share Judge
Kaufman’s pride in Filartiga,149 especially as a phenomenon unique to
the United States.150  Setting to one side prudential concerns that
might justify dismissal in a given case, the prudential reasons for exer-
cising the jurisdiction are patent. Filartiga actions at their narrowest
are essentially civil rights claims against officials of a foreign govern-
ment on behalf of that government’s own citizens.  Our own basic civil
rights law proceeds on the theory that courts at the place of a govern-
mental violation of human rights are not trustworthy enforcers of the
human rights of their own residents.151  The Fourteenth Amendment
valuable choses in action. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688–90 (1981)
(holding American hostages’ rights to sue precluded by the Iranian Claims Tribunal cre-
ated by bilateral executive agreement); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363, 387–88 (2000) (preempting Massachusetts’s regulation of its own contracts with com-
panies doing business in Myanmar as an interference with the President’s conduct of for-
eign relations).
Our courts seem routinely to defer to such tribunals or funds.  The Supreme Court
has even held that our courts are wholly powerless to scrutinize the wrongs of foreign
governments, even in the absence of such an agreement, even in suits between private
parties.  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438 (1964) (fashioning a
federal common-law defense prohibiting all courts from adjudicating the validity of a for-
eign act of state).  There is an analogy to the act of state doctrine in the domestic as well as
foreign judicial avoidance of political questions.  But Chief Justice Marshall, who first iden-
tified the problem of “questions in their nature political,” explained that an otherwise
justiciable claim of violation of individual right cannot present a political question and is
always justiciable.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803).
Compensation is characteristically meager, and the appointed distributors of such
funds, although persons of reputation and integrity, can be powerless even to discover who
the fund beneficiaries are, or to distribute payouts before the deaths of beneficiaries. Cf.
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425, 427–29 (2003) (prohibiting California’s
courts from ordering discovery of the identity of beneficiaries of insurance policies of Hol-
ocaust victims, when the information could have assisted officials in distributing the funds
established for the beneficiaries by the host countries, where many such beneficiaries or
their heirs resided in California, and the insurance companies were withholding the infor-
mation; reasoning that the fund had been created by international agreement to which the
United States adhered, and this preempted private rights to sue).
149 Cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kaufman, J.) (“Our
holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First Congress, is a
small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from
brutal violence.”).
150 See Burley, supra note 46, at 464 (“[T]he [ATS] is a source of pride, a badge of
honor.”); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 466 (1997) (citing endorsements
of Filartiga by the Justice Department, the American Law Institute, and Congress).
151 Cf. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 241 (1972) (describing concerns voiced in
Congress during the Reconstruction era about the futility of relying on the courts of for-
mer slave states to vindicate civil rights). But see WHITE, supra note 4, at 286 (referring to
the failure of criminal cases at the place of atrocity or in international tribunals, contrast-
ing civil cases under the Filartiga principle succeeding at last in forcing German industrial-
ists to regurgitate profits from slave labor during the Nazi period; referring also to cases in
which stonewalling banks were forced at last, under the Filartiga principle, to yield up mon-
eys belonging to Holocaust victims and their survivors).
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is based on the recognition of an analogous need to impose a consti-
tutional common law of multistate norms upon the several states for
violations occurring within their borders.152
The Kiobel Court all but annulled the subject-matter jurisdiction
granted by the Alien Tort Statute for the very cases for which Filartiga
had made it matter, cases in which the alleged tort occurs within the
territorial borders or waters of a foreign sovereign.153  It is the “distant
genocide,”154 precisely, that the Filartiga action seeks to address.  Con-
gress, attempting to codify Filartiga on its facts in the Torture Victim
Protection Act, required that the defendant act “under color of for-
eign law.”155  In other words, Congress read the Alien Tort Statute as
grounding cases arising within the territory of a foreign sovereign, at
least to the extent the misconduct of a foreign government official is
likely to occur on that sovereign’s territory.
These truths considered, Kiobel, unanimous as it was, seems
plainly wrong.  Certainly it upended long-settled understandings.156
Even so, we would have to agree with the unanimous Kiobel Court if,
like the Justices, we could find no overriding national interest in adju-
dicating Filartiga cases.  And we would have to agree with the Kiobel
Court if we were shown real foreign relations problems attending spe-
cific Filartiga litigations.  But if these two conditions are not met we
can fairly conclude that Kiobel ’s assault on Filartiga was gratuitous and
that the Supreme Court of the United States shot down a high-flying
achievement of American law—for no reason.
VI
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
The only reasons given for the Kiobel Court’s assault on Filartiga
were its concerns that the Filartiga cause of action posed serious
threats of interference with the foreign relations of the United
152 David M. Smolin, Fourteenth Amendment Unenumerated Rights Jurisprudence: An Essay in
Response to Stenberg v. Carhart, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 815, 819 (2001).
153 WHITE, supra note 4, at 286 (“Until the Filartiga v. Pena torture case, victims were
caught up in a stacked-deck game. . . .  [H]uman  rights violations were considered exclu-
sively an internal matter of the very countries that had perpetrated them in the first
place. . . .  Filartiga reshuffled that deck.”).
154 See generally Leval, supra note 17 (arguing for expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction
in the United States and elsewhere).
155 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(codified as a Note to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)).
156 See, e.g., Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 180–81 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining
that “[a]lthough the plaintiffs did not claim that any of the South African government’s
alleged violations of the law of nations occurred in the United States, at the time they filed
their complaint they assumed (as did most American courts at that time) that no such
geographical connection was necessary” (footnotes omitted)); Flomo v. Firestone Nat’l
Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “no court to our knowl-
edge has ever held that [the ATS] doesn’t apply extraterritorially”).
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States157 and of retaliatory Filartiga-style actions abroad against our
own citizens.
The foreign relations concern, although superficially plausible,
upon closer examination seems unwarranted.158  Certainly no acute
quarrels have arisen on account of Filartiga.  To the best of my knowl-
edge not a single foreign ambassador has been recalled or an Ameri-
can ambassador hauled on the carpet because some aging former
dictator has been haled before our courts.  Certainly no problems of
foreign relations existed in Kiobel itself.  Two of the concerned foreign
sovereigns in Kiobel, Great Britain and the Netherlands, submitted a
joint brief which, while arguing that the Alien Tort Statute should not
be applied extraterritorially, purported to be neutral as to the re-
sult.159  This was also the approach taken by the European Union.160
A country not involved in the Kiobel litigation filed an amicus brief in
favor of the petitioners.161  There was no brief or suggestion letter
from the U.S. State Department urging judicial restraint.  The United
States filed a brief which, while arguing that the “foreign-cubed” facts
of this particular case162 did not warrant cognizance under Filartiga,
nevertheless wound up supporting federal common-law claims under
Filartiga.163  Throughout both oral arguments, the United States main-
tained this position.
157 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring) (observing that the Court’s decision was based almost entirely on concerns about
foreign relations).
158 See Jonathan Hafetz, Human Rights Litigation and the National Interest: Kiobel’s Applica-
tion of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 107,
108 (2013) (arguing that the foreign relations problem of alien tort litigation is
“overstated”).
159 See Brief of the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither
Party, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL
2312825, at *4 (“This brief is purely intended to set out the Governments’ view of the most
relevant international legal principles and takes no position on the underlying factual and
legal disputes between the parties to this particular case.”).
160 Brief of the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 2012 WL 2165345
(June 13, 2012).
161 See Brief for the Government of the Argentine Republic as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 2012 WL 2165334 (June 13, 2012).
162 For the argument that Kiobel was a domestic case notwithstanding the place of the
tort in Nigeria, the Nigerian citizenship of the plaintiff, and the Dutch place of incorpora-
tion of the defendant, see infra Part X.  For the further argument that, even if the United
States lacked significant contact with either Kiobel or Filartiga, it had an important govern-
mental interest in both cases and in alien tort litigation generally, see infra CONCLUSION.
163 See Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 2012 WL 2161290, at *4 (June 11, 2014)
(“[T]he Court should not articulate a categorical rule foreclosing any [Filartiga style] appli-
cation of the ATS.”).
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The Chief Justice gave as his sole example of damage to, or inter-
ference with, our foreign relations caused by Filartiga the fact that a
dissent in an unrelated case in a lower court had noted that several
countries had “complained” about Filartiga actions.164  This is remark-
ably weak support, but in any event it is hardly surprising that the
representatives here of foreign countries would be found trying to
promote their own interests in protecting their own officials from lia-
bility, or, with at least equal assiduity, their companies, wherever those
companies were doing business and whatever business they were do-
ing.  Foreign sovereigns can vindicate their enterprise-protective inter-
ests in their own courts.  But there is no principle requiring an
American court to subordinate to the enterprise-protective interests of
a foreign sovereign any interest the United States might have in apply-
ing its own law in its own courts.165  All the Justices in Kiobel, neverthe-
less, were persuaded that our foreign relations could be disrupted or
damaged should Kiobel be remanded for litigation and Filartiga al-
lowed to survive.  Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment, con-
curred as well in perceiving the supposed threat but ventured to
suggest that the threat to our foreign relations could be contained by
forum non conveniens166 and other defenses to be found in the foreign
164 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (citing Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 77–78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part) (not-
ing objections to extraterritorial applications of the ATS by Canada, Germany, Indonesia,
Papua New Guinea, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).  Reasonably
friendly relations with these countries have not suffered because of Filartiga.
165 This is a bedrock principle of our law.  See the foundational cases: Alaska Packers
Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935) (Stone, J.) (holding in a work-
ers’ compensation case that the place of employment was free to enforce its own tort law,
and neither the Due Process Clause nor the Full Faith and Credit Clause required it to
defer to the law of the place of injury, as to hold that in a true conflict the state must always
apply the other state’s law but never its own would be an “absurd result”); Pacific Employ-
ers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 498 (1939) (stating that the place of
injury, similarly, was free under the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses to apply
its law in disregard of the law of the place of employment); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
571, 581–82 (1953) (holding, as a matter of general admiralty law, that more than one
country might have an interest in remediation of a maritime tort, and that it was not re-
quired that any one particular interested place govern).
166 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1677 (2013) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring). But see, for example, the reversal of the dismissal for forum non conveniens in a re-
lated litigation against Shell.  Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88, 106 (2d Cir.
2000) (remarking that if the courts were to grant jurisdiction in alien tort cases only to
dismiss for forum non conveniens the courts will have done “little to enforce the standards of
the law of nations”).  For further argument along this line, see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 797–800 (1993) (holding, among other things, that principles of
comity are prudential only and discretionary in each particular case); see generally Anne-
Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 191 (2003) (analyzing
the increasing level of deference among the high courts of several nations); Louise Wein-
berg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L. J. 53 (1991) (concluding that comity in practice produces
far more negative than positive consequences).
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relations jurisprudence commonly applied by our courts in individual
cases.167
Our courts generally do say they must block extraterritorial appli-
cations of law in transnational cases because they do not want to inter-
fere with the rights of foreign sovereigns to govern what happens on
their own territory.168  The presumption then, in this regard, is the
functional equivalent of a rule of deference to the law of the place of
transaction or occurrence or injury.169  Yet the concern about foreign
relations cannot realistically be a concern about interfering with the
laws that prevail where the events in litigation occurred, for six
reasons:
First, the atrocities complained of in cases like Filartiga and Kiobel
are universally outlawed, even at the places of atrocity or in the home
countries of corporate defendants.  In Kiobel, the place of injury, Nige-
ria, may insulate foreign companies from certain liabilities,  but, like
other countries with substantial economies, Nigeria also has general
laws outlawing murder, rape, arson, and pillage.  There may be cor-
rupt or evil government at the place of atrocity.  But the very point of
the universal jurisdiction exercised in Filartiga litigation is that all civi-
lized nations subscribe to the same specific, universal, and obligatory
norms of human rights.170  So Filartiga claims cannot interfere with
the official views of the place of occurrence or any other putatively
civilized country, however badly governed. Ex hypothesi, there is no
conflict of laws in these cases.
Second, precisely because there is no conflict of laws in Filartiga
cases, foreign countries worth deferring to cannot justly complain
when international norms to which they subscribe find enforcement
wherever the perpetrators can be found.  As for foreign courts under
terrorist governments, or in countries host to predatory companies,
they can hardly expect that our courts should extend “comity” to
them in cases concerning their governments’ official terror or the un-
punished predations of companies doing business there.171
167 See generally Andrew S. Bell, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGA-
TION 23–49 (2003).
168 See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014).
169 See generally James Donnelly-Saalfield, Irreparable Harms: How the Devastating Effects of
Oil Extraction in Nigeria Have Not Been Remedied by Nigerian Courts, the African Commission, or
U.S. Courts, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 371 (2009) (discussing the likely
inadequacy of foreign courts, whether or not foreign law is like our own, and the failures of
American courts in addressing this inadequacy).
170 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880–81 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
171 During the writing of this Essay, however, the whole Court agreed that comity is so
far due the host country of atrocity-committing companies and their sole owners, that the
extension of personal jurisdiction over them be reversed.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.
Ct. 746, 761–62 (2014) (scolding the Ninth Circuit for failing to consider the principles of
comity on which Kiobel relied). Daimler was a Filartiga action adjudicating corporate com-
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Third, Filartiga creates no interference with the sovereign right of
a country to govern events within its borders at the time of occur-
rence.  In Kiobel, Nigeria had every opportunity to prevent these viola-
tions, but instead facilitated them.
Fourth, lest it be supposed that this country’s policy in alien tort
litigation is to defer to the law of the foreign country in which alien
torts occur, Congress, in the Alien Tort Statute, identified and man-
dated the body of law to be administered within the subject-matter
jurisdiction it grants, and that law is most assuredly not the law of the
place of occurrence.  The violation must be a violation of “the law of
nations” constituting a “tort,”172 which in our courts is subsumed as
federal common law.  On its face the Alien Tort Statute rejects the sov-
ereign right of the place of occurrence or any other particular place
to govern that occurrence by its own municipal law.  To the extent
that imposition of a territorial limit on the Alien Tort Statute repre-
sents a desire to defer to the law of a foreign sovereign, that would be
to repeal, not construe, the Alien Tort Statute.
Fifth, even if that argument can be overcome, the laws of the gov-
ernment allegedly responsible for atrocity can readily be afforded ex-
clusive governance of the atrocity right here in the United States by
any American court.  Our courts have power to apply the law of any
sovereign if there is a rational basis for doing so.  It is this power that
prompted Judge Kaufman in Filartiga to suggest that the law of Para-
guay might govern that case.173  However, to reconcile application of
the law of the place of occurrence with Congress’s choice of “the law
of nations,” an American court would have to be convinced in each
case that the place of occurrence would enforce international norms.
Sixth, it is the exercise of jurisdiction in this country that Kiobel
trashed, no matter what law is applied.  None of the opinions in Kiobel
suggest that the case could proceed if only Nigerian or Dutch or English
law were applied.
These arguments considered, the asserted concern about foreign
relations can have little to do with any principle of “comity” either to
foreign courts or foreign law.
If, as is more likely, the fear of injury to our foreign relations is in
some measure a concern about retaliatory litigation, as Chief Justice
plicity in “disappearances” of persons in Argentina during that country’s “Dirty War.” Id. at
751.
172 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
173 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571, 582–83 (1953) (providing a framework under which each of a number of
countries in an international admiralty case might have sufficient contact with the case’s
underlying facts to warrant application of its law).
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Roberts suggested in Kiobel,174 that seems equally without founda-
tion—for the very reason the Justices in Sosa and Kiobel urged as
ground for complaint.  They saw as a fault that the United States, al-
most without exception, is the only country the courts of which have
provided damages for violations of human rights abroad.175  They are
right about American exceptionalism in this regard.  In the three de-
cades since Filartiga there has not been a single example in any coun-
try of a retaliatory Filartiga-style action for damages against American
officials or companies for a violation of international norms.176  True,
there are occasional prosecutions abroad of our nationals, if not con-
victions, for violations of human rights, whether in international tribu-
nals or the courts of foreign countries,177 and prosecutions against
our high officials are a threat, however ineffectual.178  Such prosecu-
tions will occur, given a certain anti-Americanism.179  In this matter,
American judicial concerns about reciprocal comity seem to be un-
reciprocated.180  In Filartiga itself, Judge Kaufman was careful to limit
the case explicitly to civil actions only,181 duplicating one of the func-
tions of the words “tort only” in the jurisdictional grant, and avoiding
any conflict with international agreements or treaties concerning
criminal prosecution to which we are or may become signatory.  Un-
174 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (“Moreover, accepting petitioners’ view would imply that
other nations, also applying the law of nations, could hale our citizens into their courts for
alleged violations of the law of nations occurring in the United States, or anywhere else in
the world.”).
175 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668 (explaining that there is “no indication that the ATS was
passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of
international norms”).
176 See Leval, supra note 17, at 231 (noting that “no other nation’s courts will entertain
such a suit”).
177 These prosecutions are rare and can be strikingly unsuccessful.  On the faine´ant
performance of the European Court of Human Rights, see Alan Cowell & Andrew Roth,
Ruling on Katyn Killings Highlights Russia-Poland Rift, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, at A8 (term-
ing “incomprehensible” the technical jurisdictional grounds on which the European Court
of Human Rights failed to adjudicate the Katyn Massacre and cover-up).
178 See generally MICHAEL HAAS, GEORGE W. BUSH, WAR CRIMINAL?: THE BUSH ADMINIS-
TRATION’S LIABILITY FOR 269 WAR CRIMES (2009) (examining the possibility of prosecutions
against the Bush administration); INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES,
supra note 121 (observing the war on terror’s effect on the outcome of a conference on war
crimes and current politics); STEPHEN MACEDO, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS
AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004) (exploring
the development of support for universal jurisdiction to prosecute governments that com-
mit crimes).
179 See US: Geneva Case Against Bush Shows Need to Prosecute Torture: Ex-President
Cancels Switzerland Trip After Threatened Protests and Criminal Complaints, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/07/us-geneva-case-
against-bush-shows-need-prosecute-torture.
180 See Jodie A. Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corpora-
tions to Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
259, 260 (2012).
181 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
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like foreign courts and international tribunals, the United States has
no record of asserting universal criminal jurisdiction—jurisdiction in
the absence of crimes or war crimes against this country—and the
United States is most unlikely to assert such a jurisdiction in retalia-
tion to prosecutions of American officials abroad.  Our response to
prosecution of Americans at the places of their foreign crimes is char-
acteristically deferential.182
Far from any retaliatory reaction, admiring tort cases mirroring
Filartiga in intention are reportedly beginning to emerge abroad.183
Filartiga has impressed Western courts, in particular English-speaking
courts, and is discussed in foreign journals as a credit to American
justice.184  With increasing confidence plaintiffs in foreign courts are
referring to the American Alien Tort Statute.  Among these are cases
filed against corporations, including English and Dutch cases against
Royal Dutch Shell, for environmental damage to farmers in Nige-
ria.185  According to Liesbeth Enneking, Filartiga-style litigation de-
ploying universal jurisdiction and the common law is occurring in the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.  And the absence of “alien
tort” legislation has not been an impediment to this litigation, which
182 See Mark Kukis, Should Iraq Prosecute US Solders?, TIME, Aug. 26, 2008, available at
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1836217,00.html.  We may be un-
duly deferential to the host countries of the American military personnel who are accused
of crimes.  Certainly exception should be made for Americans accused of crimes in coun-
tries providing barbaric penalties or deficient process.
183 The most salient foreign case representing a modern tendency toward universal
civil jurisdiction in human rights cases is also the most recent, and is the Dutch Shell Nigeria
Case, brought by a Dutch chapter of Friends of the Earth and four Nigerian farmers.  Ac-
cording to Liesbeth Enneking, other examples of human rights litigation abroad influ-
enced by Filartiga include civil claims in the Trafigura case before the High Court in
London brought by Ivorians, and the Probo Koala toxic waste dumping case, as well as
“claims against Shell by 11,000 Nigerians from the Bodo community in relation to two
serious oil-spill incidents in the Niger Delta that are currently also pending before [the
High Court].”  Enneking, supra note 37, at 45.
184 For examples see Oguru v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC, Court of the Hague, Docket No.
HA ZA 09-579 (Neth.) (action by Nigerian villagers alleging that oil spills caused by Royal
Dutch Shell deprived them of their livelihood); The People of Nigeria Versus Shell: The Course
of the Lawsuit (Dec. 2009), https://www.milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/factsheets/the-
course-of-the-lawsuit; Vereniging Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Shell, Court of the Hague,
Docket No. HA ZA 09-579 (Neth.) (same); Kirshner, supra note 180, at 260 (remarking
that parallel proceedings are advancing in Nigeria; also referring to Guererro v. Monterrico
Metals PLC, [2009] EWHC (QB) 2475 (Eng.)).  For the settlement in this latter case, see
Peruvian Torture Claimants Compensated by UK Mining Company, LEIGH DAY (July 20, 2011),
http://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2011/July-2011/Peruvian-torture-claimants-compen
sated-by-UK-mining.
185 See supra note 18.  The Dutch case is one of ordinary tort rather than human rights.
On other such actions see generally Simon Baughen, Holding Corporations to Account: Craft-
ing ATS Suits in the UK?, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 533, 558–68 (2013); Binnie, supra note
95, at 18 n.4 (listing English cases of assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction); LIESBETH
F.H. ENNEKING, FOREIGN DIRECT LIABILITY AND BEYOND 92, 104 (2012).
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proceeds on general tort principles, emphasizing duties of conduct
rather than human rights.186
Another, more compelling concern, not explicitly mentioned in
Kiobel, might be that adjudication here could upset delicate negotia-
tions between the U.S. State Department and affected foreign coun-
tries, or might embarrass the executive in some other way in the
conduct of foreign affairs,187 or differ somewhat in the balance of
sticks and carrots that the President may be offering foreign govern-
ments in hopes of improving their treatment of minorities or encour-
aging them to abide by treaty commitments or to give up weapons of
mass destruction.188  Whatever its merits, this supposed concern is al-
ready the subject of effective protective devices.  The State Depart-
ment can file amicus briefs and letters of suggestion, to which courts
tend to defer when they see good reason for doing so.189  The Court
has preempted state law touching on foreign relations when the con-
text is an ongoing dispute or negotiation.190  And the courts have
adopted potent protective doctrines as a matter of federal common
law, such as the “act of state” doctrine191 and forum non conveniens.
Indeed, it is the frequent injustice of dismissals on such grounds as
these that should concern us rather than the popular bugaboos of
interference with foreign governance and threats of retaliation.
Nor can the Court’s concern have to do with our security, al-
though none of the Justices mentioned this, perhaps not wanting to
seem cowed by terrorism.  It might be imagined that terrorists will
attack us if a Filartiga action is brought against terrorists or organiza-
tions supporting them.  However, Filartiga actions against terrorist or-
ganizations are not maintainable under the cognate Torture Victim
Protection Act,192 and had Filartiga survived intact, it is more likely
than not that our courts would be guided by that statute as an expres-
186 See Binnie, supra note 95, at 2.
187 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).  Congress over-
rode Sabbatino for cases in which the expropriated property is within our territorial jurisdic-
tion.  22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (“Hickenlooper Amendment”).
188 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 388 (2000).
189 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1439–41 (2012),
190 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374–77 (2000) (preempting Massachusetts’s regulation of its
own contracts with companies doing business in Myanmar as an interference with the Pres-
ident’s ability to calibrate the tightening or easing of sanctions to the conduct of
Myanmar).
191 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416.  See the discussion of Chief Justice Marshall, supra note
148.  A claimed violation of individual right, in this most authoritative of views, if presented
in an otherwise proper case, should always be justiciable.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at
170–71. See generally Louise Weinberg, Political Questions and the Guarantee Clause, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 887 (1994) (arguing that no question of law can be confided to the political
branches, and no claim of individual should be dismissed on the ground that it presents a
political question).
192 Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1708–11 (2012).
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sion of the will of Congress.  An action against a particular terrorist is
possible, but of course if a terrorist is captured here he is prose-
cuted.193  If captured on the battlefield abroad during hostilities he is
typically confined at Guantanamo or some other such facility, and af-
forded military hearings.194  If a wanted terrorist is abroad and his
whereabouts known, the President might order him targeted with
drones.195  This may be viewed as “extrajudicial killing” or, on the
other hand, a method, in a “war” on terrorists, of safeguarding civil-
ians more effectually than can be done with indiscriminate bombing
or heavy-handed military interventions.196  Civil litigation in American
courts is a very different matter.  Transparently, deference in our
courts to the power of foreign sovereigns to (mis)govern at the ex-
pense of the lives of their civilians (and our diplomats, soldiers, aid
workers, medics, and journalists) can hardly add luster to the charac-
ter of the United States among nations.197
There might seem to be a risk that some action taken by our
country or by Americans will infuriate and enflame peoples of cultures
very different from ours in ways we cannot always predict.  But no pub-
lic furor, rational or irrational, in any country, has ever greeted an
occasionally successful Filartiga litigation.
Finally, American legal and constitutional culture, like our music
and our movies, are world envied.  Our ideals are ideals toward which
many peoples worldwide are striving.  Our provision of a measure of
justice for an individual damaged by an abuse of human rights must
be at least as much the subject of admiration as of head-wagging.  If
we win our ideological wars it is likely to be because of the soft power
of our ideals.198  In this view, American alien tort litigation surely ad-
vances America’s moral standing and authority in the world.199
193 See id.
194 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
195 Michael D. Shear & Scott Shane, Congress to See Memo Backing Drone Attacks on Ameri-
cans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/us/politics/obama-
orders-release-of-drone-memos-to-lawmakers.html?pagewanted=all (reporting on docu-
ments about performing drone strikes on U.S. citizens abroad who are considered
terrorists).
196 Ned Resnikoff, The War on Terror is the Problem, Not Drones, MSNBC, Feb. 6, 2013,
available at http://www.msnbc.com/the-ed-show/the-war-terror-the-problem-not-drones.
197 For the impact on perceptions abroad of our fidelity to American ideals, see, for
example, India-America Relations on Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at A22; David Brunn-
strom & Lesley Wroughton, U.S., India Meet to Get Ties Back on Track After Dispute, REUTERS,
Jan. 14, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/15/us-india-usa-
meeting-idUSBREA0E01X20140115.
198 See G. John Ikenberry, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS (May–June 2004).
199 For the post-Kiobel argument that American alien tort litigation advances the
United States’s strategic interests, see generally Hafetz, supra note 158.
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All this considered, the Supreme Court appears to have shut
down, or tried to shut down, an important body of litigation out of
sheer ideological bluster on the right and confusion on the left.
When suggestions of calamity and retaliation, and pious utterances
about “extraterritoriality” and “comity,” are all that is needed to deny
access to courts that are powerful, confident, and independent
enough to provide a measure of justice in cases of egregious wrongs,




Let us pause for a moment to look into the future.  Assuming that
Congress cannot bring itself to override Kiobel as it overrode Aramco—
the discredited case on which Kiobel (and Morrison) relied201— what
options are available to courts below?  The fate of Filartiga on its facts
was probably correctly predicted by Justice Kennedy, concurring in
Kiobel.  He read the Court’s opinion as confining torture cases under
Filartiga to the Torture Victim Protection Act.202  But what of other
Filartiga actions?  Perhaps Filartiga litigation will somehow go forward
as if there had been no change.  The phenomenon is not unknown.203
Or courts might read Kiobel narrowly.  The Ninth Circuit recently
achieved a particularly adroit feat of narrow reading, vacating and re-
manding the dismissal of a post-Kiobel alien tort case on the following
reasoning (note the particularly deft use of the phrase, “on other
grounds”):
In light of intervening developments in the law, we conclude that
corporations can face liability for claims brought under the Alien
200 Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 456 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting).  Of course Filartiga litigation against a corporate defendant would present very
different problems from the expropriation involved in Sabbatino.  But Congress overrode
even Sabbatino on its facts, since the property in litigation was here, in our own territorial
waters.  22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (“[Hickenlooper Amendment”).  Inexplicably, in failing to
provide a convincing or simply principled rationale for denying long-established access to
American justice, the unanimous Supreme Court is exhibiting itself as instead providing
blanket protection from accountability for crimes against humanity to multinational giants
like Shell.
201 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (citing EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991)); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (same).
202 See supra notes 135–45 and accompanying text.
203 Consider that anti-busing legislation was enacted during the Nixon administration,
with little or no effect on federal judicial busing decrees during that period. See Gary
Orfield, Congress, the President, and Anti-Busing Legislation, 1966–1974, in 2 SCHOOL BUSING:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 109 (Davison Douglas ed., 1994) (noting
that the courts found the poorly drafted legislation “either meaningless or
unconstitutional”).
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Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, —U.S.
—, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669, 185 L.Ed.2d 671 (2013) (suggesting in
dicta that corporations may be liable under ATS so long as pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application is overcome); Sarei v.
Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (hold-
ing that corporations may be liable under ATS), vacated on other
grounds,  U.S., 133 S. Ct. 1995, 185 L.Ed.2d 863  (2013); Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (same), vacated on other
grounds, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 2011) (same). Addi-
tionally, the district court erred in requiring plaintiff-appellants to
allege specific intent in order to satisfy the applicable purpose mens
rea standard. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d. Cir. 2009).204
In another “foreign-cubed” scenario, a foreign wrongdoer might
be using this country as a haven, in which case, notwithstanding for-
eign wrongdoing and a foreign plaintiff, an American national inter-
est might arise.  Justice Breyer, concurring in Kiobel, thought as
much.205 Filartiga might have been such a case.  But the defendant in
such cases is within the jurisdiction of some court in this country with
ready access to ordinary common-law remedies. Filartiga would hardly
matter.
The question arises whether Filartiga might survive in a “foreign-
squared” case.206  To suit the rule of Kiobel, that could be a case in
which both parties are foreign but the violation of international law
occurred in the United States.  One can imagine, for example, Iranian
undercover operatives torturing an Iranian refugee in this country on
suspicion that he is a spy for this country.  Other “squared” configura-
tions would fall afoul of Kiobel ’s rule that there can be no alien tort
adjudication of events occurring within the territory of a foreign sov-
ereign.  Presumably courts would have to see the “two foreigners in
America” case as “touching and concerning” the United States.  But
again, the ready availability of state common-law remedies for torts on
our soil makes approval of resort to Filartiga most unlikely.  Indeed,
204 Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013).  Internal citations
have not been omitted—in order to convey more fully the Ninth Circuit’s ingenuity.
205 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 760 (2004).
206 One commentator thought Doe v. Exxon would survive Kiobel because Exxon has
extensive operations in the United States, employs tens of thousands of Americans, is head-
quartered in the United States, and sends many thousands of barrels of oil from Indonesia
to the United States every year. See Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains
Open to “Foreign Squared” Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013), http://
www.scotusblog.com/?p=162617 (suggesting that corporations with more than a “mere
corporate presence” may be subject to liability).  In reality, Exxon and Kiobel are similar as
far as the U.S. activities of the defendant are concerned. See infra Part X.B.  For a case
jerry-rigged to appear “domestic cubed” (and succeeding thus far), see Sexual Minorities
Uganda v. Lively, 2013 WL 4130756 (D. Mass. 2013).
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given the ready availability of ordinary tort law to deal with events oc-
curring here in the United States,207 “extraterritoriality” is hardly a
malfunction of Filartiga litigation.  Rather, it is evidently both its es-
sence and its point.  Far from being the killer flaw in Filartiga actions,
“extraterritoriality” is their sine qua non of Filartiga actions.  Extraterri-
toriality was not a problem overlooked when Judge Kaufman read the
plain language of the Alien Tort Statute to create an extraordinary
remedy for atrocity abroad.  Rather, had Filartiga survived Kiobel intact,
extraterritoriality would increasingly have been perceived as a defin-
ing feature of alien tort litigation.
It is also possible in theory for a “foreign squared” case to arise in
which an American defendant acting abroad committed a Sosa-suffi-
cient tort to a foreigner.  In Kiobel, if the company acting in Nigeria
had been an American company, presumably this would have
“touched and concerned” the United States and could have overcome
the presumptive rule against extraterritoriality.  Where an American
official is the defendant in a “squared” case, however, the result is
likely to be governed by Sosa. There, the defendants were American
officials, the plaintiff a Mexican, and the officials’ relevant misconduct
occurred partly in Mexico.208 The Court in Sosa specifically rejected
Filartiga in this “squared” configuration as threatening an open-ended
displacement of Bivens,209 the federal common-law action for a consti-
tutional tort by a federal official.
What about the case of a single foreign contact?  This case must
confront the same difficulties.  Where the plaintiff is a foreign suitor,
she is alleging a tort by an American defendant on American soil, and
ordinary common law or civil rights remedies will render Filartiga su-
perfluous and therefore unavailable.  If the defendant is a foreigner
over whom there is transient jurisdiction here, the American plaintiff
and the American event will easily evoke these same bodies of law.
Filartiga might come into play where two Americans become involved
in a Sosa-sufficient tort abroad, since Kiobel is not in the way in matters
“touching and concerning” the United States, and presumably a
human rights violation by an American person causing damage to an
American person would fall within our sphere of interest.
207 The Supreme Court customarily ousts civil rights relief in favor of ordinary tort
remedies if available.  The Court denies federal relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), where state common-law remedies
are arguably available; see, for example, Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).  It also
denies state relief under Bivens’ older analog for actions against state officials, Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), when ordinary tort remedies are available; see, for example,
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693(1976).
208 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–99.
209 542 U.S. at 736–37.
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It might be supposed that it would help to bring a more usual
Filartiga case in state court or under the general federal-question juris-
diction of the United States district courts,210 rather than in their
alien tort jurisdiction.  However, the Sosa Court threw cold water on
the latter expedient; Justice Souter  feared that permitting federal-
question jurisdiction in alien tort cases would somehow open the
floodgates of federal common law.211  Justice Souter need not have
been concerned.  Under any head of jurisdiction in any court, the
Supreme Court’s rulings—even its new territorialism—would tend to
remain the same, as the Supremacy Clause requires.  True, Kiobel was
pinned to the Alien Tort Statute; but the extraterritoriality defense is
not so pinned, as Morrison suggests.  True, Kiobel ’s presumption
against extraterritoriality is supposed to apply to statutes, not cases.
But in Kiobel itself the presumption was applied to a common-law
cause of action.  After Kiobel, cases arising within the territory of a for-
eign sovereign would still be dismissed, with or without the presump-
tion, simply because Kiobel ’s foreign relations rationale seems to
require dismissal.  Even if a Filartiga action somehow survived an im-
mediate motion to dismiss, it would still be circumscribed by the re-
quirements of Sosa sufficiency, preemption in torture cases by the
Torture Victim Protection Act, and the Court’s emerging jurispru-
dence insulating Filartiga defendants other than individual govern-
ment officials.212
We are seeing, then, that much of the heady speculation about
cubes, squares, and alternative courts or heads of jurisdiction, is prob-
ably pointless.  The best hope may lie, rather, in courts recognizing
that some supposedly “foreign-cubed” cases like Kiobel may actually be
domestic cases, “touching and concerning” the United States.  I will
turn to that argument in a later Part.213
210 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Professor Casto urges this latter course.  William Casto, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain and the End of History, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1001, 1003 (2012).  Professor
Casto argues adroitly that Sosa unmoored alien tort from the alien tort jurisdiction, so that
the intentions of the founders become irrelevant, and § 1331 becomes open to cases Sosa
would exclude.  But I fear that federal-question jurisdiction could not keep Filartiga alive,
for the reasons stated in the text.  Decided cases, although technically distinguishable, in
the Roberts Court would be held to control the substantive issues in any Filartiga style case
under any head of jurisdiction. See Weinberg, supra note 95, at 1093–94.
211 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 n.19.  With some inconsistency, Justice Souter also insisted
that he did not mean to “imply that every grant of jurisdiction to a federal court carries
with it an opportunity to develop common law.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731.  However, under the
Due Process Clauses, and Erie as well, federal law applies where it applies, and state law
applies where it applies, and in both instances it does not matter whether the law applied is
statutory law or case law.  U.S. Supreme Court cases are supreme federal law in any court
or under any head of federal jurisdiction, anything in a state’s statutes or constitution to
the contrary notwithstanding.
212 On this last point, see Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1704
(2012).
213 See infra Part X.
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VIII
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TRANSITORY ACTION
Let us indulge for a moment the Justices’ unanimous assumption
that Kiobel was a case based on wholly foreign facts.  It may come as
something of a shock, on that view of the facts, that the Supreme
Court’s new territorialism is in serious tension with Supreme Court
cases on what the Constitution requires in interstate cases and sug-
gests for international ones, particularly with regard to access to
courts.
Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the
Constitution,214 in interstate cases the right of access to courts for
nonresident plaintiffs is guaranteed, no matter where their claims
arose—or even, assuming personal jurisdiction, no matter where their
defendants reside.  Cases on access to courts, open courts, equal pro-
tection, the right to travel,215 and so on, are to the same effect.  In the
case of Hughes v. Fetter, the Court held, by Justice Black, that state
courts of general jurisdiction are under a constitutional duty to adju-
dicate a transitory cause of action arising in a sister state.216  Justice
Black reasoned that access to otherwise competent courts for ordinary
torts, wherever arising, is compelled by “the national policy of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause” of Article IV.217 Hughes began as an action
for wrongful death, the fatal injury having occurred out of state.218
Justice Black reasoned that the forum state simply had no interest in
not taking the case.219  He pointed out that the state had “no real
feeling” against wrongful death actions.  Wrongful death was triable in
that state.220  In short, Hughes v. Fetter holds that a state court of gen-
eral jurisdiction must adjudicate an ordinary tort wherever it arises.221
214 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).  These “Privileges” include
access to courts for residents of sister states.  Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552–53
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). Cf. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1872) (“It is . . . the
right of the citizen of this great country, protected by implied guarantees of its Constitu-
tion, [to have] . . . free access to . . . courts of justice in the several States.” (quoting
Crandall v. State of Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867))).
215 In Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–03 (1999), the right to travel was finally located in
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
216 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951); Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294
U.S. 532, 545 (1935).  Concededly, the parties in Hughes were joint domiciliaries of the
forum state.  For cases specifically on such facts, see infra Part X.C.
217 Hughes, 341 U.S. at 613; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
218 Hughes, 341 U.S. at 610.
219 Id. at 612–13.
220 Id. at 613.
221 For interesting discussion of this subject in the context of Filartiga and Kiobel, see
generally Chimene I. Keitner, State Courts and Transitory Torts in Transnational Human Rights
Cases, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 81 (2013).
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Analogously, under the Supremacy Clause and the classic case of
Testa v. Katt (also authored by Justice Black), state courts are under a
constitutional obligation to adjudicate federal actions otherwise prop-
erly before them.222  Just as state courts are under a duty to try transi-
tory claims arising in other states, they are under a similar duty to try
federal claims, again without regard to where a claim arose, all else
being equal.223
In the silence of Congress about the territorial scope of legisla-
tion, these constitutional ground rules clearly point to a default rule
contrary to the default rule applied in Kiobel.  The proper rule would
give nonresidents access to our courts when in the exercise of a juris-
diction granted, within that jurisdiction’s own written bounds and
none other.  True, the interstate case and the federal-state case are
only analogies and are as different from the international case as they
are from each other.  Nevertheless they reflect a background of “pos-
tulates which limit and control.”224  They are a powerful reminder to
American lawyers and judges of the duty of American courts to exer-
cise a jurisdiction given.  In the international case, subject to pruden-
tial defenses such as forum non conveniens (which are not blanket rules
but are discretionary in the individual case), we can conclude, as
Judge Kaufman did in Filartiga, that American courts are under a gen-
eral obligation to adjudicate transitory actions otherwise properly
before them—including cases in which the underlying events oc-
curred abroad.225  The Kiobel Justices’ conviction that our courts are,
or should be, powerless to deal with events occurring within the terri-
tory or waters of another sovereign has no basis in these long-settled
understandings.
222 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389–90 (1947) (holding under the Supremacy Clause
that state courts must take federal cases and enforce federal laws).  Since Testa the Su-
preme Court has consistently held that state courts must accept jurisdiction over a federal
cause of action and apply federal law. See Hayward v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734 (2009);
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283–84 n.7
(1980).
223 See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876)  (“The . . . State . . . is subject also
to the laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as operative
within the State as it is to recognize the State laws. The two together form one system of
jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the State; and the courts of the two
jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but as
courts of the same country, having jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent.”).
224 Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
225 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (“It is not extraordinary for
a court to adjudicate a tort claim arising outside of its territorial jurisdiction.  A state or
nation has a legitimate interest in the orderly resolution of disputes among those within its
borders, and where the lex loci delicti commissi is applied, it is an expression of comity to give
effect to the laws of the state where the wrong occurred.”)
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IX
SOME OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND RULES
I cannot help noticing the outdatedness of the Kiobel Court’s ex-
clusively territorial approach to a question which may be considered
one of choice of law and, ultimately, one of constitutional law.  Prelim-
inarily, I have to say that the Court’s new territorialism is markedly
inattentive to progress in choice-of-law methods in state and federal
courts over the last three-quarters of a century.226  Because govern-
mental interests can and do transcend territorial boundaries, and
often overlap, the rule of law can be hijacked by territorial rules that
are unconnected to the merits of particular cases.
The conflicts question—and, ultimately, the constitutional ques-
tion—in Kiobel, released from its ill-fitting jurisdictional straitjacket,
was whether American courts could  be allowed to continue to adjudi-
cate foreign atrocities under the rule of Filartiga.  Because Filartiga,
like Kiobel, is widely assumed to have been a case on wholly foreign
facts,227 the question was whether American human rights law under
Filartiga could reasonably be applied in Kiobel.  The ultimate constitu-
tional question, stated more concisely, was whether the Filartiga doc-
trine comprised an irrational displacement by American law of the law
of a more relevant foreign sovereign.  In more general terms, would
the application of our federal common law of human rights in Kiobel
be arbitrary or irrational because our law can have no relevance to
foreign events involving foreign people?  Has the choice of American
law in all “foreign-cubed” Filartiga litigation been unconstitutional all
along, as a matter of due process?  Has it been arbitrary and irrational
because without rational basis?
If there is a rational basis, then, for Filartiga litigation, Filartiga is a
constitutional remedy because it is a reasonable one, ex hypothesi.  Rea-
sonableness, then, is the test of constitutionality and thus of the pro-
priety of a choice of law.  But what is the test of reasonableness?  It
must be admitted that the Supreme Court’s test of reasonableness in
cases on the conflict of laws certainly does seem to have to do with
territorial contacts.  The Supreme Court, by Justice Brennan, set out
the modern due process test for choices of law in 1981 in Allstate Insur-
226 See Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631,
1633–45 (2005) (describing the twentieth century revolution in choice-of-law thinking).
Cf. Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI.
L. REV. 227, 253–54 (1958) (famously analyzing traditional territorialist choice-of-law rules
and concluding that such rules generate “problems where none existed before, and more
often than not [dispose] of those false problems unsatisfactorily”; introducing a new inter-
est-analytic means of classifying conflicts and choosing law).  The choice-of-law revolution
is widely attributed to Currie’s work.
227 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885 (Kaufman, J.) (describing the case as “outside [the United
States’] territorial jurisdiction”).
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ance Co. v. Hague, a test which endorses earlier understandings228 and
has never been disapproved:
[F]or a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally
permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.229
Under this test, the Hague Court controversially230 approved fo-
rum law favoring its resident plaintiff even though the plaintiff was
not a resident of the forum state at the time the claim arose.231  And
Hague trebled the liability of the defendant, although the forum had
only general jurisdiction over the defendant, and the defendant was a
different branch of the defendant insurer232 than the branch from
which the insurance was obtained.233 Hague was decided by a 4:4 plu-
rality (Justice Stewart did not participate), but the Hague test was ac-
228 Cf. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 541–42 (1935).
229 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981); see Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 541–42 (“Objections
which are founded upon the Fourteenth Amendment must, therefore, be directed, not to
the existence of the power to impose liability for an injury outside state borders, but to the
manner of its exercise as being so arbitrary or unreasonable as to amount to a denial of
due process.”).
230 See, e.g., John H. Ely, Choice of Law and the State’s Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 173, 187–89 (1981) (criticizing the reasoning in Hague). Contra, Louise
Weinberg, Conflicts Cases and the Problem of Relevant Time: A Response to the Hague Symposium,
10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1982).  For further discussion see Linda J. Silberman, Can
the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation?: Federal Choice-of-law Constraints After Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 103, 104 (1981).  It should be noted that the result in
Hague was not controversial as far as the courts below were concerned.  Both had gone the
same way.
231 Hague, 449 U.S. at 312–14.
232 The jurisprudence of general jurisdiction over corporate subsidiaries has since
been modified. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2851 (2011) (holding that foreign subsidiaries of an American company are not amenable
to suit here for injuries to Americans abroad). Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746,
763 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.) (holding that Daimler lacked sufficient contacts with California
to be considered “at home” there, and thus was not amenable to suit there in a Filartiga
action by an Argentina plaintiff against Daimler for aiding and abetting the Argentina torts
of its subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz).  The assertion of jurisdiction in Daimler would seem to be
particularly attenuated.  But I pause to note the possibility that the American theory of
general jurisdiction, as traditionally applied, enshrined a necessary legal fiction, somewhat
analogous to the theory of personalization of a ship.  These fictions serve key functions in
the administration of justice, presenting reasonably relevant defendants and providing
funding for necessary compensation.  For an insightful description of the functions of the
latter fiction, see The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53, 63–69 (1868).  But instrumentalism of
this sort is unlikely to be viewed today with an approving eye.
233 These features of Hague in effect rejected the reasoning, while preserving the rule,
of the Court’s foundational choice-of-law case, Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408
(1930) (Brandeis, J.) (holding, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, that Texas had no power to expand the liability of the defendant reinsurers in an
action on the insurance policy, because: “nothing in any way relating to the policy sued on,
or to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in Texas. . . .  The
fact that plaintiff Dick’s permanent residence was in Texas was without significance.  At all
times here material, he was physically present and acting in Mexico”).
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knowledged, reasserted, and quoted in full by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.234  Under this
test, as in earlier Supreme Court cases informing modern conflicts
thinking,235 it does not matter if another sovereign also has legitimate
governmental interests.236  The interested forum is free to choose its
own law.237
The Hague-Shutts rule is also buttressed by an additional doctrine,
emerging from a pair of cases written by Justice Brandeis in the 1930s,
neither of which were interstate cases.  The first was a transnational
conflicts case little known by writers on constitutional law, but one
which is  considered fundamental to modern conflicts theory, Home
Insurance Co. v. Dick.238  The second was the famous federal-state con-
flicts case, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.239  Each of these cases involved
what a conflicts expert, schooled in the writings of Brainerd Currie,
would identify as a “false conflict.”240  That is, in each of these cases,
only one of the two concerned sovereigns had any interest in applying
its law.  Each of these two cases held that an American court could not
constitutionally displace the law of the only relevant sovereign with its
own irrelevant law.241  In Erie the only relevant law was state law; and
234 472 U.S. 797, 818–20 (1985) (holding that, although the forum with only inconsid-
erable contacts with a class could take jurisdiction of a class action, it could not apply its
own law to the substantive rights of the class).
235 See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582–83 (1954) (pointing out that any
number of countries in a transnational case might have significant contacts with the case
warranting application of their law); Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294
U.S. 532, 547 (1935) (holding, under the Due Process Clause, that the place of contracting
was free to apply its workers’ compensation law on behalf of an injured worker, notwith-
standing that the place of injury was elsewhere; explaining that although full faith and
credit could be required of judgments, it could not be required of choices of law, since this
would lead to the “absurd result,” Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 523, that in every two-state case
the forum must apply the other state’s law, but never its own).  Since Alaska Packers, full
faith and credit arguments in choice of law are taken as equivalent to due process argu-
ments. See Hague, 449 U.S. at 308.
236 Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 550 (“No persuasive reason is shown for denying to Cali-
fornia the right to enforce its own laws in its own courts, and in the circumstances the full
faith and credit clause does not require that the statutes of Alaska be given . . . effect [in
California].”).
237 Although the Court has never said so, the interested forum probably ought not to
depart from its own law, and arguably cannot constitutionally do so, no matter what the
interests of other sovereigns.  This teaching seems implicit in cases like Hughes v. Fetter, 341
U.S. 609 (1951), discussed supra Part VIII. Cf. Weinberg, supra note 166, at 59–60 (noting
that the costs of comity “might outweigh the conceivable benefits”). See generally Louise
Weinberg, On Departing from Forum Law, 35 MERCER L. REV. 595 (1984) (arguing that a
departure from forum law may discriminate against a resident party).
238 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
239 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
240 The false conflict case (as opposed to the no-conflict case, in which the laws of both
concerned sovereigns are the same) was first identified by Currie, supra note 226.
241 Dick, 281 U.S. at 411; Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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in Dick the only relevant law was foreign law.242  True, the rationales of
the two cases differ. Erie was based on a lack of national power, in the
absence of any national interest, to substitute some irrelevant general
rule for the relevant law of an identified state.243  And Dick was based
on the forum state’s lack of power to substitute its own irrelevant law
for the relevant law of Mexico.244  In Dick, the displacement of rele-
vant law was held to be a violation of due process.245  But one realizes, in
retrospect, that Erie could have been based on due process too.246  In
each of the cases the forum had no rational basis for its expansion of
the defendant’s liability because it had no legitimate governmental
interest in doing so.  Together with the Hague-Shutts test, these princi-
ples of law’s applicability are the measures of the process that is due.
Constitutional provisions can reflect background “postulates
which limit and control,”247 but can also reflect background postulates
that empower and facilitate.248  In our progressive reformulations of
the question in Kiobel, we are finding that, in the end, what is needed
to ground governmental power is a legitimate governmental interest.  The
question in Kiobel, on both the conflicts and constitutional levels, was
whether, in the absence of territorial contacts with the United States
(as the Kiobel Court saw the facts), there existed any national interest in
adjudicating and remedying the alleged violations of human rights,
such that applying our human rights law under Filartiga would not be
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.
I will turn to that question in my concluding argument, but I
pause to note that the opinions in Kiobel were bare not only of the
Supreme Court precedents mentioned in this Essay , but also of Amer-
ican legal reasoning as we have understood it ever since Alexander
Hamilton deployed it in his great state paper on the Bank,249 and
Chief Justice John Marshall unpacked it in the great case of McCulloch
242 See Dick, 281 U.S. at 411; Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
243 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
244 See Dick, 281 U.S. at 411.
245 Id. at 410–11.
246 Weinberg, supra note 95, at 1069–70.
247 Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322.
248 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.) (“Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but con-
sist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”).
249 Alexander Hamilton, The Argument of the Secretary of the Treasury Upon the Constitution-
ality of a National Bank 4 (1791).
[E]very power vested in a government, is in its nature SOVEREIGN, and in-
cludes, by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite and
fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power and which are
not precluded by restrictions and exceptions specified in the Constitution,
or not immoral; or not contrary to the essential ends of political society.
Id.
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v. Maryland, when he declared, “Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohib-
ited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.”250  Their arguments in reliance on law’s “ends” and
“means” provide such a useful framework for thinking about the ap-
plicability of law that today that framework undergirds the tiered scru-
tiny deployed in virtually all constitutional cases.251  The inquiry looks
to the ends—the governmental purposes—of law, and then considers
whether the means employed are tailored to those ends.  Thus today’s
Justices must know, but seemed, in Kiobel, not to remember, that the
scope of law, statutory or decisional, is necessarily determined in the
first instance by its purposes—its ends—the governmental interests to
be served.
True, in Kiobel Chief Justice Roberts expatiated at length on the
purposes of the rule against extraterritoriality.  But he had nothing to
say about the purposes of—the national interest in—the phenome-
non the Court was targeting for demolition, Filartiga.  In failing to in-
quire into the rational bases, if any, supporting what was at stake in
the case—alien tort litigation—the Kiobel Court flung aside constitu-
tional guarantees of reason in favor of a good old unreasoning rule.
Rules versus reason.  It is an old controversy, but should have been
laid to rest long ago.  There is no substitute for reason.
I do not doubt that it was bad process and bad policy to impose a
Draconian territorial rule upon the Alien Tort Statute so as to render
it unfit for use.  If, however, in Kiobel, there were no territorial con-
tacts with the United States and nothing touching and concerning the
United States, and if for those very reasons there was no discernible
interest of the United States in adjudicating Kiobel, I would have to
concede that to bestow upon the Kiobel plaintiffs a cause of action
under our law would have been to impose liability arbitrarily on the
defendant—a denial of due process.
But in fact Kiobel was not without significant territorial contacts
with the United States.
X
HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT
Thus far we have accepted the Court’s view that the parties in
Kiobel were both foreign.  Since the place of the tort, Nigeria, was also
foreign, there were no “contacts” in the case—to paraphrase the
Hague-Shutts test—sufficient to generate a legitimate national interest
250 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
251 See generally Weinberg, supra note 95.
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in applying our human rights law, such that application of our law
under Filartiga would have been unreasonable and unfair.  Although I
will argue at the close as promised that the case was wrongly decided
even if this assumption were sound, I should point out that the as-
sumption was wrong.
A. Compensatory Interests: The Plaintiffs
It is hard to keep in mind, reading the opinions of the Justices in
Kiobel and the transcript of the reargument, that the Kiobel plaintiffs
were not “Nigerians,” or at least not only Nigerians.  Nigeria was their
probable place of birth, and perhaps they were Nigerian nationals or
citizens in a formal sense.252  But they were actually residents of the
United States, long-time legal residents.  (Chief Justice Roberts men-
tioned this, but he did so casually, as if it were a matter of no signifi-
cance.253)  Ironically, although the plaintiffs had their only home
right here in the United States, the plaintiffs’ lawyer could not com-
fortably say so.  An action pleaded under the Alien Tort Statute, of
course, must be brought “by an alien.”  In the first oral argument in
the case, counsel did say that the plaintiffs were residents of the
United States; but this was part of a response to a question about alter-
native forums, and passed unremarked.  In the second oral argument,
again in response to a question about alternative forums, counsel
managed to say, more relevantly, “They sued here because this is
where they live.  This is their adopted homeland. . . .”254  And later,
more vaguely, “[O]ur clients are here, they’re here.”255  Indeed, they
had been living “here” for nigh on twenty years.  They had fled from
Nigeria, had been granted asylum here, and had no intention of re-
turning or going anywhere else.  Any student of the conflict of laws
could tell you that on these facts and with these intentions, the Kiobel
plaintiffs were domiciled here.256
252 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013).
253 Id. at 1663 (Roberts, C.J.) (“[P]etitioners moved to the United States where they
have been granted political asylum and now reside as legal residents.” (citing Supp. Brief
for Petitioners 3 & n.2)).
254 Transcript of Oral Argument II, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 2012 WL
4486095,  at *6 (Oct. 1, 2012).
255 Id. at *17.
256 “Domicile” is a term of art in the law of conflict of laws, as it is, variously, in state
laws, for example, governing taxation of estates upon death.  In the conflict of laws “domi-
cile” is a quantum of presence, coupled with no present intention of moving anywhere
else.  The domiciliary party is always a substantial “contact” with the forum state, and injury
to her has substantial effect or impact upon the forum state, no matter where the injury
occurred.  Although in days gone by the domiciliary state might consider itself selfish in
counting the residence of the plaintiff as a significant contact, today this is increasingly
understood to be the major contact a forum can have with a case. See, e.g., M. Anderson
Berry, Whether Foreigner or Alien: A New Look at the Original Language of the Alien Tort Statute,
27 BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW 316, 374–81 (2009).
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The answer to a question depends on the purpose for which it is
asked.  The Kiobel plaintiffs were Nigerians—for purposes of pleading
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute.  But they were also legal re-
sidents of the United States for purposes of weighing the impact of
the tort on the United States—that is, for purposes of evoking the
interest of this nation in remedying harms to its residents, wherever
caused.257  That they were legal residents also mattered for purposes
of rebutting the supposed presumption against extraterritorial appli-
cation of acts of Congress.  Such changes in dealing with personal sta-
tus in different contexts258 arguably were within the contemplation of
the drafters of the Alien Tort Statute.259  In Kiobel, these somewhat
different questions should not have been fudged together.  Differenti-
ated answers to different questions would not have required mental
gymnastics beyond the capabilities of the Court or the Chief Justice.
Think, for example, of the recent “Obamacare” case,260 in which, for
purposes of avoiding the Anti-[Tax] Injunction Act,261 the fine for dis-
obeying the Affordable Care Act’s “individual mandate” was held to be
a “penalty, not a tax.”262  But for purposes of testing the constitution-
ality of the individual mandate, the fine for disobeying it was held to
be “a tax, not a penalty.”263  However, having merely “scotch’d” the
Filartiga snake nine years previously in Sosa, the Kiobel Court was now
intent on killing it.264
I have said that the Kiobel plaintiffs were settled residents of the
United States.  One pesky issue does arise in identifying residence.
That identification might be thought to depend on the point in time
at which residence is established.  If residence in a country is estab-
lished only after the events in suit, it might be thought that such resi-
257 For recent discussion of the relevance of the plaintiff’s residence to the choice-of-
law inquiry, see Am. Guarantee and Liability Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 668 F.3d
991, 996–1000 (8th Cir. 2012) (interstate conflict in a commercial case).
258 On this class of questions, see generally, in this symposium, Gerald L. Neuman,
Extraterritoriality and the Interest of the United States in Regulating its Own, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
1441 (2014); and see infra Part X.B.
259 See Berry, supra note 256, at 321–22 (reporting that the word “foreigner” was de-
leted from the proposed enactment and the word “alien” substituted for it, in order to
open American courts “to residents of the United States”).
260 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (sustaining
the “individual mandate” of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A, on the reasoning that, although a mandate to purchase a good is (supposedly)
beyond the commerce power of Congress, and imposes a condition on spending (suppos-
edly) beyond Congress’s spending power, it is also a tax within Congress’s taxing power).
261 The particular anti-injunction statute at issue, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), provides that no
court may enjoin assessment or collection of a tax.  The taxpayer must first pay the tax and
then sue for a refund.
262 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2655.
263 Id. at 2595.
264 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act III, sc. 2 (Eugene M. Waith
ed., 1954) (“Macbeth. We have scotch’d the snake, not kill’d it.”).
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dence, being after-acquired, is irrelevant.  Is the only relevant
residence the place where the plaintiff lived at the time of the events
in controversy?  Or is it the place where the plaintiff resides at the
time of litigation?  In Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, Justice Brandeis as-
sumed—and this was an important part of his reasoning—that the
only relevant time in determining the plaintiff’s residence was the
time when the underlying events took place.265  Although Dick was
born in Texas, and resided at the time of litigation in Texas, at all
relevant times, Justice Brandeis insisted, “the plaintiff was a resident of
Mexico.”266  In Brandeis’s view, neither the place of birth nor the af-
ter-acquired residence of the plaintiff could, consistent with due pro-
cess, apply its law to expand the liability of the defendants, over whom
there was only jurisdiction quasi-in-rem, when at all times relevant to
the events in litigation the plaintiff resided at the place of the underly-
ing events, Mexico.
But, in that respect, Home Insurance Co. v. Dick has been departed
from.  The Supreme Court jettisoned Brandeis’s view on this point
fifty years later in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague.267  In Hague, the
Court held, by Justice Brennan, that the after-acquired residence of the
plaintiff  had a legitimate governmental interest in applying its law to
provide a more complete remedy for the plaintiff.  This interest  also
enabled the forum in Hague to impose expanded liability upon a dif-
ferent branch of the defendant insurer, over whom there was only
general jurisdiction.268  Under Hague, then, the existing interests of the
putatively concerned states are what need to be considered.  Contacts
long since extinguished do not count.  It is the present residence of the
plaintiff in the forum state that invokes the adjudicatory and compen-
satory interests of the forum.269  The present residence of the plain-
tiff, all else equal,  is rationally empowered to apply plaintiff-favoring
law.  It would have made little sense to count Mrs. Hague a resident of
Wisconsin, where all relevant events occurred, after she had married a
Minnesota man, left Wisconsin for good, and taken up a new life and
a bona fide residence in her new husband’s state.  She was administer-
ing the estate of her first husband in Minnesota and, as representative
of the local estate, was suing the local branch of the insurer.  The
insurance payment sued for would have had to be paid into the estate
in Minnesota among the other estate assets, if any, that she could mar-
265 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930).
266 Id.
267 449 U.S. 302, 318 (1981).
268 Id.
269 For an arguably analogous current example, see de Csepel v. Rep. of Hung., 714 F.3d
591 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (furnishing a remedy to the plaintiff whose residence in the United
States was acquired after the alleged wrongful conversion of the artifacts to which he
claimed title).
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shal.270  Wisconsin had little or no interest in balking full recovery for
her in Minnesota, the place where she was actually domiciled at the
time of litigation,271 and the Wisconsin branch of the insurer did not
need the protections of Wisconsin law, not being a party to the
widow’s lawsuit.
How does Kiobel differ from Hague in this?  At the time of litiga-
tion, the United States had a distinct interest in remedying the tort to
its resident, and could rationally apply its Filartiga cause of action to
vindicate that interest.  As to that interest, it was immaterial where the
place of events happened to be.  As Hague and Hughes v. Fetter teach, it
cannot matter to the forum’s existing interest in applying its law to
favor its plaintiff that the underlying events occurred elsewhere.  The
only conceivable interest Nigeria could have retained vis-a`-vis the Ki-
obel plaintiffs, as their former residence and perhaps the place of their
formal citizenship, would have been in the services its diplomats in the
United States could have rendered for their comfort upon their arri-
val here long ago.
B. Regulatory Interests: The Defendants
Also hiding in plain sight in Kiobel was the truth about the named
defendant, the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company.  This was the com-
pany whose only contact with the United States was supposed to be a
small office in New York City maintained by an affiliate to deal with
public relations vis-a`-vis potential shareholders.272  How did this small
office become the only contact between the United States and the Ki-
obel case?  This small office in New York was put forward as the basis of
general jurisdiction over the defendant, however questionable such
jurisdiction after Goodyear,273 and with a decision in Daimler274 immi-
nent.  It was the flimsiness of this “minimal and indirect American
presence” of “a Dutch company” that convinced Justice Breyer that
the case was, in effect, a lawsuit on stilts.275
270 Hague, 449 U.S. at 305.
271 Id. at 305–06.
272 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1677 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
273 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J.) (holding that the bare fact of ownership of the tortfeasor company by an
American company is an insufficient contact with this country of a foreign tortfeasor sub-
sidiary unless the subsidiary itself has sufficient contacts with the forum state to be consid-
ered “at home” in it).
274 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, at *9–11 (2014) (holding that general juris-
diction over a parent corporation, Daimler, without sufficient contacts with California to
consider the parent “at home” in California, were insufficient to ground an action by an
Argentina plaintiff in California state court for the human rights violations in Argentina of
a foreign subsidiary doing business in Argentina, Mercedes-Benz).
275 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1678 (Breyer, J.) (“Under these circumstances, even if the New
York office were a sufficient basis for asserting general jurisdiction, it would be farfetched
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In Esther Kiobel’s amended complaint, three foreign oil compa-
nies were joined as defendants.276  The first was Shell Petroleum De-
velopment Company of Nigeria, Ltd. (“Shell Nigeria”), the company
directly involved in the Nigerian atrocities.277  Its motion to dismiss
for want of personal jurisdiction had been granted,278 but the Niger-
ian company did not raise this dismissal in the court of appeals, and
the plaintiffs took the position  that the jurisdictional issue was
waived.279  However that may be, the Nigerian company remained
physically present by counsel280 and filed a brief in the Supreme
Court.281  The second named defendant was Shell Transport and
Trading, sole owner of the Nigerian subsidiary.282  The third was the
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., a sister subsidiary of Shell Transport and
Trading,283 not to be confused with the giant company Royal Dutch
Petroleum LLC.  Although Royal Dutch Petroleum had nothing to do
with the case, it was an occupant of that small office in New York
where both it and Shell Transport were served with process.284
Royal Dutch Petroleum’s small office in New York City was doing
some pretty heavy lifting in the case.  First, this small office lay conve-
niently within the territorial limits of effective service of domestic pro-
cess of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York.285  Second, this same small office was also allowed on all
sides to constitute the “minimum contact” between the case and the
State of New York sufficient to ground a constitutional exercise of the
district court’s general jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
to believe, based solely upon the defendants’ minimal and indirect American presence,
that this legal action helps to vindicate a distinct American interest. . . .  Thus I agree with
the Court that here it would ‘reach too far to say’ that such ‘mere corporate presence
suffices.’” (contrasting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846
(2011)).
276 See id. at 1662; Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol.
Co. (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 02 CV 7618).
277 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63.
278 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co. (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 02-7618), 2010 WL 2507025,
at *10 (unreported op.).
279 Transcript of Oral Argument II, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 2012 WL
4486095, at *4 (Oct. 1, 2012).
280 The interests of Shell Nigeria were particularly engaged, given the parallel litiga-
tion against it going on at the Hague. See supra note 18.
281 Supplemental Brief for Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co. (No. 10-
1491), 2012 WL 3127285, at *1 (2012).
282 Amended Class Action Complaint at 12–13, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co.
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 02 CV 7618).
283 Id.; see also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
284 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring).
285 For purposes of service within the United States, the relevant rule requires a pres-
ence within the state in which the district court sits. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k); see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 4(h)(i).
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Royal Dutch Petroleum Company.286  Third, the small New York of-
fice apparently served, for want of any perceived alternative, as the
alleged significant contact for purposes of establishing a “significant
relationship”287 between the case and the United States, sufficient to
overcome the Court’s presumptive rule against extraterritoriality.
Buried in the case was a further question, which I suspect the Court
did not want to reach, and which I remain very glad it did not
reach,288 the constitutional question whether imposition of liability
under American human rights law, in a “foreign-cubed” case, on the
basis of flimsy general jurisdiction over the small office in New York of
an unrelated subsidiary, would be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.289
These are four very different functions to pile onto a small office
in New York City.290  Whether adroitly or in confusion, or because
there was a difference of opinion whether issues of personal jurisdic-
tion had been waived altogether, Chief Justice Roberts did not deal at
all with questions of personal jurisdiction.  It was enough for him that,
given his view of the plaintiffs as foreign “nationals,” and the fact that
the events in suit occurred in Nigeria, he could conclude that the
United States had nothing to do with the case.291  It served his pur-
pose that the minority, concurring, was convinced that the one named
defendant, having nothing to do with the case beyond its convenient
small office in New York, lacked sufficient contact with this country to
286 In the second oral argument in Kiobel, the Justices appeared to view the jurisdiction
over Royal Dutch Petroleum as doubtful, and seemed surprised or even disappointed to
learn that the question of personal jurisdiction over this defendant had not been argued in
the court of appeals and might be considered waived. See Transcript of Oral Argument II,
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 2012 WL 4486095 (Oct. 1, 2012), at *3–4.  Waiver was
disputed by counsel for the defendant, however. Id. at *22.  General jurisdiction over a
subsidiary (or unrelated branch), in a case in which the parent was not particularly “at
home” in the forum state, was rejected by the Court as this Essay went to press. See Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
287 The phrase “most significant relationship” is typically used by federal courts in
choosing which state’s law to incorporate on issues traditionally governed by the states
within cases otherwise governed by federal law. It is taken, as used throughout, from RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
288 See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
289 Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (“[F]or a State’s substan-
tive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a
significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”).
290 But see Katherine L. Caldwell, Harboring Pirates on the New York Stock Exchange? A Look
at “Mere Corporation Presence” in Kiobel, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 22–24 (2013) (argu-
ing that the small office in New York might be important since public relations vis-a`-vis
potential shareholders could affect the defendant’s value on the New York Stock Ex-
change).  Breyer correctly did not count the NYSE listing itself as a “contact,” remarking
that foreign corporations are often listed. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1677.
291 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
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rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.292  But it was not,
precisely, Royal Dutch Petroleum’s lack of connection with the case
that impelled Justice Breyer’s concurrence.  Perhaps Justice Breyer be-
lieved that Royal Dutch Petroleum, having been named a party and
served with process, had to have something to do with it.  Rather, it was
the flimsiness of Royal Dutch Petroleum’s contacts with the United
States that impelled Justice Breyer to concur in the judgment, taking
the rest of the liberal wing with him.293  The minority Justices were
obviously unwilling to expose a foreign company to heavy liabilities
for alleged misconduct in Nigeria on the thinking that an unrelated
affiliate’s small office in New York invoked a national interest in so
doing.  A small New York office of an unrelated affiliate, an office de-
voted to public relations with potential shareholders, furnished a con-
tact so inconsiderable for purposes of trying an international atrocity
as to be beneath notice.294
The skeptical reader may be troubled by known actual facts.295
Who can pretend that Royal Dutch Petroleum was not Shell?296  The
huge parent and its various artificial subsidiaries were alter egos.  The
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company enjoyed only a brief existence
roughly coinciding with the litigations in New York, from 2002 to
2007, as a corporate “shell” for Shell Petroleum Co., until reabsorbed
292 Id. at 1672, 1677–78  (Breyer, J., concurring).
293 Id.
294 But see Paul S. Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 325
(2002) (proposing a more globalized perspective on jurisdiction given the globalization of
human activity).
295 Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., is wholly owned, as was
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., by Shell.  Amended Class Action Complaint at 12–13, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petrol. Co. (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 02 CV 7618).
296 Shell redeployed in the instant case its Brief in Opposition in Kiobel’s earlier case
in the Supreme Court. Respondents Brief in Opposition, Kiobel v. Shell Petrol. N.V., 2011
WL 3584741 (Aug. 12, 2011).  Shell conveniently described therein the parties defendant
to the suit as: “Shell Petroleum N.V., successor to Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, and
the Shell Transport and Trading Company, Ltd., formerly known as The ‘Shell’ Transport
and Trading Company, p.l.c.  Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., was
a defendant in the district court, but was not a party to the proceedings before the court of
appeals and is not a respondent here.” Id. at *ii.  Shell’s Rule 29.6 Statement therein fur-
ther described the respondent companies in three paragraphs, as follows:
Respondent Shell Petroleum N.V., successor to Royal Dutch Petroleum
Company, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, p.l.c.
Respondent the Shell Transport and Trading Company, Ltd., formerly
known as The ‘Shell’ Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c, is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Respondent Shell Petroleum N.V., except for one
share that is held by a dividend access trust for the benefit of one class of
ordinary shares of Royal Dutch Shell, p.l.c.*
*Royal Dutch Shell, p.l.c. is a publicly traded company. No publicly
traded company has a 10% or greater stock ownership in Royal Dutch
Shell, p.l.c.
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by it.297  Shell Petroleum, in turn, is wholly owned by Royal Dutch
Shell PLC.  And all these entities are owned by the Shell Group of the
United Kingdom.298  A veritable shell game.  (Pun intended.)  Who
can share the Justices’ near–“Arabian Nights” reverence for corporate
veils, however thin and many-layered?  Their tolerance for corporate
shell upon corporate shell?  (This pun also intended.)  As for Shell
Transport and Trading Company, it was delisted from the New York
Stock Exchange in 2005 and now apparently exists only in Shell
archives, having been succeeded by a revived Royal Dutch Petroleum
Company.299
The Shell Group is organized under the laws of the United King-
dom.300  It has certain executive offices in the Netherlands.301  As of
November 1, 2013, it is Europe’s largest oil company, and has global
operations.302  It has incorporated numerous subsidiaries organized
under the laws of the various places in which it is exploring and drill-
ing for oil or conducting any of its other enterprises.303  But in any
realistic appraisal, a principal place of Shell’s business, probably the
principal place of Shell’s business, appears to be the United States.304
Shell has deployed billions in rig assets for exploration in our territo-
rial waters off Alaska, and is drilling in our territorial waters in the
297 The “Royal Dutch Petroleum” designation appears, disappears, and reappears at
the Shell Group’s convenience throughout the history of Shell.  Royal Dutch Petroleum
existed as an independent Dutch corporation in 1907, but was merged with the Shell
Transport and Trading Company Ltd., and became a British corporation. See Our History,
SHELL, http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/who-we-are/our-history.html.  Neverthe-
less the executive offices are maintained in the Netherlands as “Royal Dutch Shell,” and
handles Shell’s financial decisionmaking at the highest level.
298 See Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 2007 WL
7419445, at i (2d Cir. 2007).  At Shell’s searchable website it can easily be ascertained that
the Netherlands is not the place of Shell’s incorporation, although Shell has executive
headquarters there. See Shell at a Glance, SHELL, http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/
at-a-glance.html.  Shell’s place of incorporation was and remains the United Kingdom,
where the company began in 1897 as the small import-export business of Samuel Marcus,
who previously sold used furniture and collected seashells. See Our History, SHELL, http://
www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/who-we-are/our-history.html.
299 See The “Shell” Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c., SHELL, http://www.shell.com/
global/aboutshell/investor/shareholder-information/unification-archive/st-archive.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
300 See NYSE Governance Standards, SHELL, http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/
investor/corporate-governance/nyse-gov-standards.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).




304 See Shell in the United States, SHELL, http://www.shell.us/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
Another helpful description of Shell’s operations in the United States appears at the New
York Stock Exchange website. Royal Dutch Shell plc, NYSE EURONEXT, http://www.nyse.
com/listed/rdsa.html.
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Gulf of Mexico with another great fleet of expensive delicate rigs.305
It runs a large credit card business from executive offices in the
United States, and one of the largest franchising businesses in the
world, franchising the Shell gas stations ubiquitous in this country.306
It maintains huge petrochemical plants here.307  Shell began its life as
an oil company exploring for oil in California at the turn of the last
century.308  Today Shell goes to the furthest reaches of the planet to
find petroleum to satisfy our voracious market, the world’s biggest.309
In Justice Ginsburg’s current formulation for cases of general jurisdic-
tion,310 Shell is “at home” here.  Shell is us.
A company engaging in sufficiently massive activities here to be
considered “resident” invokes American regulatory interests in Ameri-
can human rights law311 vis-a`-vis that company’s conduct abroad.312  It
is true that regulatory interests have an altruistic component that
might suggest an unreal level of disinterestedness.  Yet our law, for
example, prohibits bribery of foreign officials.313  Congress’s interna-
tional commerce power, and the inherent national powers over for-
eign affairs,314 together imply power to punish abuses of the means of
international commerce,315 including power to prohibit companies
availing themselves of the benefits of our laws and our market from
committing or supporting acts of atrocity in other countries, as well as
power to prohibit their inducing official corruption in other coun-
tries.316  Just as we become concerned if one of our big box stores is
selling goods made by workers in unsafe working conditions abroad,
we become concerned if one of the largest gas companies in our
country is selling gas made from crude oil the extraction of which is
305 See Shell in Alaska, SHELL, http://www.shell.us/aboutshell/projects-locations/alaska
.html.
306 See Shell Payment Cards, SHELL, http://www.shell.us/products-services/shell-cards.
html.
307 See Projects and Locations, SHELL, http://www.shell.us/aboutshell/projects-locations.
html.
308 See Our History, SHELL, http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/who-we-are/our-
history.html).
309 See Our Purpose, SHELL, http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/who-we-are/our-
purpose.html.
310 Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
311 See, e.g., Mia Swart, Justice Takes a Step Back for Sake of Profit (Sept. 2, 2013), http://
www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/09/02/justice-takes-a-step-back-for-sake-or-profit (stating
in the aftermath of Kiobel that “the dream of Nuremberg, that there should be no impunity
for serious human rights violations, has been deferred” and referring to Shell as a “US-
based corporation”).
312 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1).
313 Id.
314 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982).
315 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (stating that regulation of the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce are within Congress’s power).
316 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1).
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made to go smoothly by terrorizing villagers abroad.  Even if such
wrongdoing did not put downward pressure on American wages, Con-
gress would still have power; although Steel v. Bulova may be marked
for the current Court’s hatchet, that famous case did hold the obvi-
ous, that Congress has power to regulate the foreign activities of re-
sidents of this country.317
Ironically, the defendants in the Kiobel litigation were treated for
the most part as mere aiders and abettors of the atrocities alleged.318
This is partly, no doubt, because the two who were in the personal
jurisdiction of the trial court had no role in the events in suit.  More-
over, there was an unresolved question whether alien tort cases under
Filartiga, by analogy to American civil rights actions, are “officer suits,”
requiring that the defendant be a government official acting under
color of law.319  But for these oddities of the case, primary liability, for
Shell Nigeria, at least, would not have been inappropriate.320  As Chief
Justice Roberts wrote, under the necessity of taking the allegations of
the complaint as true, “According to the complaint, . . . respondents
enlisted the Nigerian Government to violently suppress the burgeoning
demonstrations.”321  Aiding and abetting emerges only after this pri-
mary instigation:
Throughout the early 1990’s, the complaint alleges, Nigerian mili-
tary and police forces attacked Ogoni villages, beating, raping, kill-
ing, and arresting residents and destroying or looting property.
Petitioners further alleged that respondents aided and abetted
these atrocities by, among other things, providing the Nigerian
forces with food, transportation, and compensation, as well as by
allowing the Nigerian military to use respondents’ property as a
staging ground for attacks.322
These allegations suggest that the Court had no need to rely on
the sole national interest in adjudicating Kiobel that Justice Breyer
could identify—the concern that this country not become a haven for
317 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282–83 (1952).
318 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63.
319 See Simon Baughen, Holding Corporations to Account: Crafting ATS Suits in the UK?, 2
BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 533, 536–37 (2013) (discussing early post-Filartiga cases involving
the question of liability of corporations and other private actors).
320 See, e.g., Abdullah v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 188–89 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding
that Pfizer could face primary liability for violation of international norms because “the
violations occurred as the result of concerted action between Pfizer and the Nigerian
government”).
321 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662 (emphasis added).
322 Id. at 1662–63. It seems unsurprising that Shell called on the Nigerian military for
suppression of protest.  The history of the British empire in India furnishes a familiar if
rough analogy.  That history involves a trading company’s suborning of local princes, and,
when unrest disturbed commerce, the company’s pressing for military intervention.  In
that case, although the military presence in India was the British army, the army was even-
tually composed largely of native troops.
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foreigners who violate human rights abroad.323  The United States has
positive regulatory interests vis-a`-vis Shell, if we can see Shell as the
ultimate perpetrator of the alleged atrocities, and if the Supreme
Court had not placed parents beyond reach for the torts of their sub-
sidiaries324—the defendant, if we can lift all its corporate veils and call
it simply “Shell.”325  And, as we have seen, the United States has com-
pensatory interests vis-a`-vis the plaintiffs, its own residents.
Once we see the parties for what they are, the Court’s perception
of “extraterritoriality” becomes an embarrassment.  Access to the Filar-
tiga remedy in fact would not have been extraterritorial at all, but fully
justified by the national interests, regulatory and compensatory, in the
parties, who very much “touched and concerned” this country.
C. Adjudicatory and Civic Interests: The Forum
We have already visited Hughes v. Fetter, and its constitutionally
required rule that, all else being equal, a state court must take a sister
state’s transitory cause of action.326  Justice Black, the author of
Hughes, did not rely upon the interest-analytic tools the Court had
made available in earlier conflicts cases.  But in his own way he made
clear that, in Hughes, there was no conflict of laws.327  Both states had
enacted wrongful death statutes, and both states regularly tried wrong-
ful death claims.  Black saw that the forum had no real interest in
declining to take the case.328  But, to modern eyes, Hughes may be not
so much about the forum’s lack of interest in declining the sister-state’s
case, as about the forum’s positive interest in taking it.  In Hughes, both
the plaintiff and the defendant were residents of the forum state.329
As any student of conflicts law can tell you, the joint residence of the
parties has power to resolve the dispute between them.330  The state
323 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring).
324 See supra note 232.
325 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, at *8–10 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.) (holding
that a parent company is not subject to general jurisdiction in a suit against a subsidiary
where the parent is not particularly “at home”). Daimler was a Filartiga action against the
parent for the tort of the subsidiary, Mercedes Benz, involving “disappeared” individuals
during the “Dirty War” in Argentina. Id. at *5.  In Daimler, Justice Ginsburg, astonishingly,
scolded the Ninth Circuit for failing to consider the principles of “comity” relied on in
Kiobel, when obviously there is no genocide, not one, however distant, to which an Ameri-
can court needs to extend comity.
326 See supra Part VIII.
327 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 n.10 (1951).
328 Id. at 613.
329 Id.
330 Cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kaufman, J.) (“It is not
extraordinary for a court to adjudicate a tort claim arising outside of its territorial jurisdic-
tion. A state or nation has a legitimate interest in the orderly resolution of disputes among
those within its borders.”); Ely, supra note 230, at 211 (discussing the power of the joint
domicile).
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forum has civic and adjudicatory interests in maintaining the peace of
the state in which both disputants live, in allowing them their mutu-
ally preferred venue, and in providing access to a local court for which
they are in some part paying taxes.  We have just seen that in Kiobel, as
in Hughes v. Fetter, the parties were not foreign to the United States but
were both lawful residents of the United States.  Given the settled resi-
dence here of both the plaintiff refugees and the defendant Shell, and
their lack of any intention to quit the United States, the parties, in
fact, were and are domiciled here.  The United States, then, had all the
power of the joint residence of the parties to resolve their dispute.
Exercise of this power could hardly offend Nigeria, either as the
place of events or the home country of Shell Nigeria, or offend the
United Kingdom,  Shell’s home country, or the Netherlands, home of
its chief financial and executive offices.  None of these countries is
likely to have atrocity-favoring law.  A relevant enterprise-protective
law of some kind is certainly a possibility.331  If any of them have enter-
prise-protective law they are free to apply it in their own courts, where,
indeed, parallel litigation is proceeding at the time of this writing.332
The forum in the United States remained free to apply the laws of any
of those places as well as its own.333  Nor does adjudication at the joint
residence in any way undercut governance by the sovereign whose ter-
ritory was the scene of the events in suit.  That place retains whatever
power it ever had and should have exercised to prevent such harmful
events from occurring.  It retains power to prosecute in its own courts
those who perpetrated those harms, and to adopt a Filartiga-style pri-
vate right to sue as well, if the victim of atrocity for some reason re-
turns to the place of the tort to sue.  But the place of occurrence has
no power to reach out and control the judges and courts of a different
country, the United States, when the latter are attempting to provide a
peaceful resolution for a dispute between its own current residents by
furnishing a civil forum to them.
331 See, e.g., ENNEKING, supra note 185, at 4 (discussing Nigerian laws protecting opera-
tors of oil pipelines from liability for sabotage and parent companies from liability for the
torts of its subsidiaries).
332 See Kirshner, supra note 180, at 260 (reporting that parallel proceedings are advanc-
ing in Nigeria).
333 Thus, in Filartiga, Judge Kaufman could suggest that the law of Paraguay might be
applied.  630 F.2d at 889.  I pause to note that in this circumstance due process may be
satisfied in the sense that the law of the place of injury, assuming its law favors the plaintiff
and thus furthers the safety of its territory, would be rational in application.  But the ration-
ality of the choice, taken in isolation, may be an insufficient basis on which to ground the
discrimination that occurs at the defendant-favoring forum when a defendant is denied
her own state’s defendant-protective law simply because the underlying event, perhaps for-
tuitously, occurred out of state.  Had the event occurred at a point only a mile away within
the defendant’s home state, the defendant would have enjoyed that protection. Cf. Wein-
berg, supra note 237.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-6\CRN607.txt unknown Seq: 58 22-SEP-14 12:13
1528 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1471
The adjudicatory interest of the United States in resolving the
dispute between its residents334 arises in no small measure from the
ultimate raison d’eˆtre of courts.  Aeschylus saw this when, in the final
moments of his great trilogy, the Oresteia, the first court in the history
of humankind comes into existence.335  At that dramatic climax, the
cycle of violence that followed upon the death of Agamemnon is re-
moved from the realm of disorder and given to courts to resolve.  The
murder of Agamemnon, awful as it is, is not on the scale of the crimes
against humanity alleged in Kiobel.  Still, it is instructive that the poli-
cies of this first court in the world, as imagined by Aeschylus, are not
solely deterrent or compensatory but also adjudicatory and civic, es-
tablishing order and the rule of law.  Interestingly Aeschylus sees these
interests also as retributive.  In this first court in the world, at the right
hand of Justice, sit the Furies.
CONCLUSION: THE NATIONAL INTEREST
It is more important than anything I have said thus far to make
clear that Kiobel was wrongly decided even if the Court were right in
thinking the case wholly foreign.
It is an irony that back in 2004, the Justices in Sosa were talking
about the governmental interests underlying the Alien Tort Statute,
and in 2013 in Kiobel, about the governmental interests underlying a
rule against extraterritoriality.  But none of the Justices in either case
were talking about the governmental interest underlying what was at
stake—the Filartiga cause of action.  To be sure, Justice Breyer, con-
curring for the Kiobel minority, did say, and presumably all would
agree, that our country has a general interest in not becoming a haven
for the perpetrators of genocide or torture.336  But Judge Kaufman
never mentioned this interest in Filartiga. Justice Breyer’s “haven” ar-
gument, in effect, was simply a rejoinder to Chief Justice Roberts’s
“magnet” argument337—that our nation has no interest in becoming a
magnet for all the world’s complaints of violations of international
law.  That observation, however, has no bearing on Filartiga actions
because Filartiga plaintiffs can hardly be said to be forum shopping.
334 See Petitioners’ Supplemental Opening Brief, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133
S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 2096960, at *8 (arguing that all nations have
adjudicatory power over cases in which the parties are within their jurisdiction).
335 AESCHYLUS, THE ORESTEIA 172–73 (Ted Hughes trans., Farrar, Straus & Giroux eds.,
2000).
336 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
337 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (referring with approval to “the ‘presumption that
United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world’” (quoting Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007))).  Chief Justice Roberts also argued that
there is no indication that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely hospi-
table forum for the enforcement of international norms. Id. at 1668 (internal citation
omitted).
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The Supreme Court cannot assume such plaintiffs have a choice, while
at the same time the Court complains that the United States has been
the only nation willing and able to adjudicate their cases.  It cannot be
presumed that they have a choice, when Filartiga cases against foreign
officials depend on the fortuity that the defendant may be in the
United States.  It cannot be complained that Filartiga is a magnet for
foreigners’ grievances, when Congress specifically required that the
plaintiff, at least nominally, be an “alien.”
In none of the Kiobel opinions can we find awareness of Judge
Kaufman’s own identification, in Filartiga, of the interest of the United
States in alien tort litigation.  Judge Kaufman read the Alien Tort Stat-
ute transformatively, but he did so by taking it seriously.  He read liter-
ally the jurisdiction’s precise requirements.  This plain reading
revealed that the ancient statute was quite fit for modern use.  Judge
Kaufman was able to accept the applicability of the statute, as pleaded,
in Filartiga—a case that appeared wholly Paraguayan to him, because
he experienced an electrifying flash of insight, opening his eyes to the
national interest in both the statute and in its application in the par-
ticular case.
The national interest of the United States in taking a human
rights case like Filartiga, Judge Kaufman explained, was by definition a
mutual, reciprocal338 interest shared by all civilized nations.  The ex-
perience of two world wars, Judge Kaufman wrote, had taught all civi-
lized nations the necessity of protecting human rights.339  “The
torturer, like the pirate and slave trader before him,” he declared,
quoting Blackstone,340 “is hostis humani generis, the enemy of all man-
kind.”  To Blackstone’s short list of universal enemies we would surely
add the perpetrator of genocide and the terrorist.  Every nation where
this universal enemy can be found, indeed, would seem to have a civic
duty to lend its courts to the task of bringing him to book—as well as a
national interest in doing so.  As Blackstone put it, this duty is incum-
bent on every nation to ensure “that the peace of the world be main-
338 To better see the reciprocal nature of this shared interest, imagine for a moment
that in some dark future day the Supreme Court should finally succeed in shutting down
American courts completely for trial of violations of civil rights occurring here in our own
country.  The thinking behind Filartiga—the hope—would seem to be that the courts of
nations still willing to extend the rule of law and order, and still protective of the rights of
individuals, would open their doors to an American seeking justice there, in just such a
case as Filartiga—at least if that is where the perpetrator can be found.
339 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
340 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 61 (1769)
(“[W]here the individuals of any state violate [the law of nations], it is then the interest as
well as duty of the government, under which they live, to animadvert upon them with a
becoming severity, that the peace of the world may be maintained.”).
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tained.”341  This reciprocal mutual interest in preserving the peace of
the world is why the enemy of all civilized nations can be sued wher-
ever found.342  This is what is meant by universal jurisdiction.  It surely
must be part of this identified national interest to bring some measure
of justice to survivors of the sufferings such enemies inflict on the
innocent.
Among all the arguments and opinions in Kiobel, only Solicitor
General Verilli, for the United States, in the second oral argument in
Kiobel, touched on this national interest, and then only after acknowl-
edging presumed interests to the contrary.  “We also have interests in
ensuring that our Nation’s foreign relations commitments to the rule
of law and human rights are not eroded.”343  In the ensuing colloquy,
it became clear that Verilli was staking out what Justice Scalia identi-
fied as a new position for the United States.344  It is one of the riddles
of Kiobel that General Verilli’s thinking seems to have eluded the grasp
of the Justices comprising the Court’s “liberal” wing.
In its way, Filartiga is as inspiring a national achievement for
human rights as Brown v. Board of Education. Filartiga accomplished
this without regard to what other countries are yet failing to do, with
confidence in the courage and power of our courts, setting a magnifi-
cent example to all civilized nations.  With Kiobel, the Supreme Court
has all but demolished this achievement.  The Justices unanimously
accomplishing this demoralizing result were inexplicably blind to the
national interest in preserving and honoring it.
Kiobel does scant honor to the traditions of this country’s tough,
independent courts.  It would far better become our character among
nations to give rather than withhold the Filartiga remedy that our
courts stand ready and able to provide.345  Amid the press of our mod-
ern global interests, the Supreme Court’s rusty Victorian lock on the
341 Id.; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1987) (providing that a “state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe pun-
ishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal con-
cern, such as piracy, slave trade,” and other analogous offenses).
342 Judge Kaufman, sitting in a then-premier admiralty jurisdiction, would have been
comfortable with universal venue in human rights cases, since there is universal venue in
admiralty.  A vessel against which claims have arisen can be arrested and sued in rem wher-
ever found, and if necessary sold to fund its liabilities.
343 Transcript of Oral Argument II, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 2012 WL
4486095, at *43–44 (Oct. 1, 2012).
344 Id. at *44.
345 Cf. The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C.D. Md. 1865) (Chase, C.J.)  (“[C]ertainly
it better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give
than to withhold the remedy, when not required to withhold it by established and inflexi-
ble rules.”).  Chief Justice Chase’s maritime observations have special bearing here, since
admiralty is notably a field in which—as in alien tort litigation—international norms be-
come federal common law, venue is universal, and the defendant can be sued wherever
found.
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necessary reach of acts of Congress in our courts can only be de-
plored. Kiobel ’s destruction of Filartiga is the least comprehensible
part of this, and, while we await unlikely revision or overrule, it fully
deserves the condemnation of scholars.
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